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1 Introduction
Is there a relationship between income or wealth inequality and business
cycle fluctuations? Recent data concerning the Latin American and OECD
economies as well as the East Asian “tigers” suggests a positive answer. In
1990, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income was on average 59.5%
for Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, and respectively 34% for the OECD
countries and 35.5% for Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. At the
same time, the former were subject to much greater fluctuations in their
respective growth rates than were the latter: during the 80’s, the standard
deviation of the rate of output growth was on average 5.9% for the above
mentioned Latin American countries, and respectively 2.7% for the OECD
and 2.8% for the East Asian countries. Building on these data, Breen and
Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa [11] show the existence of a significant positive correlation
between a country’s volatility and income inequality.
In the present paper we explore the role of the distribution of wealth
on macroeconomic volatility from a theoretical perspective. The analysis
is based on the fact that instability easily occurs in perfectly competitive
multi-sector growth model. We then take the view that the link between
wealth inequality and volatility should be first understood in the absence
of any distortion. The simplest neoclassical economy allowing for dynamic
instability is the Uzawa two-sector model with a consumption good and an
investment good. We slightly enrich the standard model by endogeneising
the labor supply. In this model the level of wealth inequality is characterized
by the distribution of shares of capital. The message of the present paper
is that within this standard framework in most of the realistic situations
wealth equality is a stabilizing factor. More precisely, wealth inequality
generates macroeconomic volatility when agents are heterogenous in their
preferences and these belong to the HARA class, i.e. individual absolute risk
tolerance is linear, a result holding independently of the wealth distribution.
The conclusion also holds when agents have preferences characterized by
non linear absolute risk tolerance and individual wealth follows a Pareto
distribution.
The sharp results obtained in this paper are at odd with the previous
related literature. Truly, the role of income and wealth inequality on macroe-
conomic volatility has been until recently largely ignored by the theoretical
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literature. Furthermore, the studies that do treat this issue consider models
with externalities, increasing returns and rigidities in which dynamic insta-
bility of the long run equilibrium, either deterministic or stochastic, easily
occurs. In these models, the various forms of market imperfections intro-
duce many degrees of freedom and prevent from getting clear-cut results.
Indeed, in some cases inequality is shown to be a stabilizing factor, as in
Herrendorf et al. [26] or Ghiglino and Sorger [21], while in others the effect
has opposite sign. A good example is here Aghion et al. [1] where inequal-
ity in the form of unequal access to investment opportunities across agents
results in output and investment volatility. Closer to the present analysis,
is the paper by Ghiglino and Venditti [22] that also investigates the link
between inequality and instability in a neoclassical model. They conclude
that wealth inequality may have an effect on instability only when the co-
efficient of absolute risk tolerance is not linear and that the direction of the
effect depends on the fourth derivative of the utility function. The value of
these results is highly reduced by these restrictions. Indeed, the exclusion
of HARA preferences is not an advisable feature of the model while the sign
of the fourth derivative is difficult to assess empirically. 1
In the present paper we show that the lack of sharp results in Ghiglino
and Venditti [22] is in part due to their assumption of inelastic labor sup-
ply. This is not too surprising as we know that the inclusion of leisure in
the choices of the agents strongly affect the stability properties of the equi-
librium in neoclassical growth models. In the present paper we also exploit
preference heterogeneity further. Indeed, if agents with different wealth have
different preferences, and thus different attitudes toward risk, the degree of
inequality has a stronger effect than with homogeneous preferences. This al-
lows us to obtain a relationship even when preferences belong to the HARA
class. Finally, we exploit the shape of the wealth distribution, particularly
by assuming a Pareto wealth distribution in which inequality is characterized
by the Gini index. These three differences allow us to provide the clear-cut
result that wealth equality has a positive effect on macroeconomic stability
in realistic scenarios.
To conclude, we should note that there is a renewal of interest in the
1See also Ghiglino [18], Ghiglino and Olszack-Duquenne [19] and Bosi and Seegmuller
[10] for similar analysis based on particular specifications for technologies and/or prefer-
ences.
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possibility that macroeconomic volatility could affect the distribution of
wealth, an issue we do not consider in the paper. For instance, Caroli
and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa [13] show that higher volatility increases income in-
equality if agents with different endowments have different attitudes towards
risk,2 while Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky [16] provide a similar conclusion
through the effect of greater production uncertainty.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The methodology and
the main results are briefly summarized in Section 2 while the model is
introduced in Section 3. Section 4 is concerned with the definition of the
equilibrium and the analysis of the effect of wealth inequality on the steady
state. Section 5 discusses the existence of endogenous business cycle fluctu-
ations. The occurrence of output volatility is related to wealth inequality
in Section 6. Section 7 focusses on the particular case of a Pareto distribu-
tion with homogeneous preferences characterized by non linear individual
absolute risk tolerance indices, while Section 8 concerns a general wealth
distribution in the case of HARA preferences. Section 9 shows the robust-
ness of our main conclusions when inelastic labor is considered and Section
10 concludes the paper. All the proofs are gathered into a final Appendix.
2 Summary of the paper
Starting from the decentralized model with many agents, our methodology
consists in aggregating heterogeneous preferences within a central planner
utility function which depends on a set of welfare weights. As the second
welfare theorem ensures that any Pareto efficient allocation can be decen-
tralized as a competitive equilibrium with transfer payments, we solve the
weighted central planner problem. The competitive equilibrium is then ob-
tained for a set of welfare weights associated with optimal allocations that
saturate the budget constraints of all the consumers. Then we show that the
welfare weights are continuous functions of the initial conditions so that the
local dynamic properties of the general equilibrium model with heteroge-
neous agents and those of the planners’ problem with welfare weights fixed
at their steady state value are identical.
Building on Bosi et al. [9], we provide conditions on the technologies
2See also Cecchi and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa [14].
3See also Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky [15].
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and the social utility function, aggregating individual preferences along the
steady state, for the existence of endogenous business cycles fluctuations
either damped in the long run or persistent through period-2 cycles.4 As
initially shown by Benhabib and Nishimura [5], we need a capital intensive
consumption good sector in order to allow some oscillations of the capital
stock “to get through” the Rybczinsky theorem. But the properties of pref-
erences also matter: first, fluctuations in the consumption levels along the
equilibrium path require a large enough social elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption, i.e. a large enough social absolute risk toler-
ance with respect to consumption. Second, a low enough social elasticity of
labor supply, i.e. a low enough social absolute risk tolerance with respect to
labor, is necessary to prevent the agents from smoothing the fluctuations of
their wage and capital incomes associated to the fluctuations of the capital
stock.5
The next step is to relate the conditions for the existence of endogenous
fluctuations to the degree of wealth inequality. The measure of inequality in
our framework is based on the distribution of capital shares across agents.
Wealth inequality is thus rising when a bilateral transfer between two agents
consists in increasing the income of the agent who is initially richer than the
other. We show that when the social absolute risk tolerance indices with
respect to consumption and labor are non linear, a modification of the degree
of inequality affects the individual and the aggregate steady states and thus
affects the local stability properties of the equilibrium. The non linearity of
the social indices can be obtained in two cases: either when the individual
absolute risk tolerance indices are non linear, or when they are linear (as
with HARA preferences) but agents have heterogeneous preferences.
We then give clear-cut conditions on the slopes of the social absolute
risk tolerance indices with respect to consumption and labor in order to
4It is worth noticing that following Benhabib and Nishimura [6] a more standard def-
inition of macroeconomic volatility based on stochastic oscillations could be considered
through the concept of cyclic sets. Indeed introducing small stochastic shocks into a
deterministic model characterized by periodic cycles generates cyclic sets.
5When the labor supply is highly elastic, fluctuations of the wage rate and the rental
rate of capital may be compensated by large modifications of the labor supply. The
fluctuations of income are thus smoothed and the cycles can be eliminated. On the
contrary, when the labor supply is weakly elastic, fluctuations of the capital stock generate
fluctuations of incomes and cycles become persistent.
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get a positive correlation between the degree of wealth inequality and the
occurrence of macroeconomic volatility. The basic intuition for this result
is the following: when a bilateral transfer increasing the degree of wealth
inequality is considered, the consumption and labor choices of the two agents
who are affected by the transfer are modified in such a way that the aggregate
steady state levels of consumption and labor are changed. This in turn
modifies the steady state values of the social absolute risk tolerance indices
with respect to consumption and labor. When these modifications are such
that the former increases while the latter decreases, or equivalently the social
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption increases while the
social elasticity of labor decreases, endogenous business cycle fluctuations
occur. In other words, increasing the level of wealth inequalities modifies the
attitude towards risk of the planner and leads to macroeconomic volatility.
The conclusions appear quite robust as we are able to prove the results in
three leading cases. First, the positive relationship between inequality and
volatility is obtained when individual wealth is distributed according to a
Pareto distribution and agents have homogeneous preferences characterized
by non linear individual absolute risk tolerance indices. Second, a similar
result holds for general wealth distributions when agents have heterogeneous
HARA preferences characterized by linear individual absolute risk tolerance
indices. Finally, we also show that all these results still hold even if the labor
supply is inelastic. In particular, we prove that in this case the introduction
of some heterogeneity of preferences across agents is a fundamental driving
force leading to our results.
3 The model
3.1 Consumers
There are n agents and the total population is constant over time. In each
period consumers provide elastically an amount of labor li, i = 1, ..., n , with
li ≤ l¯ and
∑n
i=1 li = ℓ, l¯ > 0 being the agent’s endowment of labor. At the
initial period t = 0, each agent i is also endowed with a share θi of the initial
stock of capital k0 with
∑n
i=1 θi = 1. In order to simplify the formulation,
we will assume that the n agents are ordered according to their initial capital
endowment, i.e. θi > θj for i < j. Let (θi)
n
i=1 = θ be the vector of initial
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shares. Consumer’s preferences are characterized by a discounted additively
separable utility function of the form
U i(xi,Li) =
∞∑
t=0
δt [ui(xit) + vi(Lit)] (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, xit the consumption of agent i at
time t, Lit = l¯ − lit its leisure at time t, and x
i, Li are respectively its
intertemporal streams of consumption and leisure. Agents are therefore
different with respect to their preferences and their initial wealth. Each
instantaneous utility function satisfies the following basic restrictions:
Assumption 1. ui(xi) and vi(Li) are C
2, such that u′i(xi) > 0, v
′
i(Li) > 0,
u′′i (xi) < 0, v
′′
i (Li) < 0 for any xi > 0, Li > 0, and satisfy the Inada
conditions limxi→0 u
′
i(xi) = +∞, limLi→0 v
′
i(Li) = +∞.
Denote by wt the wage rate, rt the gross rental rate of capital and pt
the price of investment good at time t, all in terms of the price of the
consumption good. In a decentralized economy, an agent i maximizes his
intertemporal utility function (1) subject to a single intertemporal budget
constraint
∞∑
t=0
Rtxit =
∞∑
t=0
Rtwtlit + θir0k0 with i = 1, ..., n. (2)
where the discount factors Rt are defined as:
Rt =
t∏
τ=0
1
1 + dτ
with dt the common interest rate which satisfies d0 = [r0 − p−1]/p−1 and
dt = [rt + (1 − µ)pt − pt−1]/pt−1 for any t ≥ 1.
6
3.2 Producers
We consider a two-sector economy with a consumption good y0 and a capital
good y. The consumption good is entirely consumed and the capital good
6This equation reflects the absence of arbitrage opportunities in a perfect foresight
equilibrium. It is also called the portfolio equilibrium condition (see Becker and Boyd [2]).
The difference between the equation evaluated at time t = 0 and t ≥ 1 comes from the
fact that at the initial date there is no residual capital coming from the previous period
and in some sense we have k0 = y−1.
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partially depreciates in each period at a constant rate µ ∈ [0, 1]. There
are two inputs, capital and labor. Each good is produced with a standard
constant returns to scale technology:
y0 = f
0(k0, l0), y = f1(k1, l1)
with k0 + k1 ≤ k, k being the total stock of capital, and l0 + l1 ≤ ℓ, ℓ being
the total amount of labor.
Assumption 2. Each production function f j : R2+ → R+, j = 0, 1, is C
2,
increasing in each argument, concave, homogeneous of degree one and such
that for any x > 0, f j1 (0, x) = f
j
2 (x, 0) = +∞, f
j
1 (+∞, x) = f
j
2 (x,+∞) = 0.
Notice that by definition, as l1 ≤ ℓ ≤ nl¯, we have y ≤ f
1(k, ℓ) ≤
f1(k, nl¯). The monotonicity properties and the Inada conditions in As-
sumption 2 then imply that there exists k¯ > 0 such that f1(k, nl¯) > k when
k < k¯ while f1(k, nl¯) < k when k > k¯. The set of admissible 3-uples (k, y, ℓ)
is thus defined as follows
D =
{
(k, y, ℓ) ∈ R3+|0 ≤ l ≤ nl¯, 0 ≤ k ≤ k¯, 0 ≤ y ≤ f
1(k, ℓ)
}
(3)
It is easy to show that D is a compact, convex set.
There are two representative firms, one for each sector. For any given
(k, y, ℓ), profit maximization in each representative firm is equivalent to
solving the following problem of optimal allocation of productive factors
between the two sectors:
T (k, y, ℓ) = max
(k0,k1,l0,l1)
f0(k0, l0)
s.t. y ≤ f1(k1, l1)
k0 + k1 ≤ k
l0 + l1 ≤ ℓ
k0, k1, l0, l1 ≥ 0
(4)
The social production function T (k, y, ℓ) describes the frontier of the pro-
duction possibility set associated with interior temporary equilibria such
that (k, y, ℓ) ∈ D, and gives the maximal output of the consumption good.
It also summarizes the trade-off between production of the final good and
productive investment. Under Assumption 2, for any (k, y, ℓ) ∈ D, T (k, y, ℓ)
is homogeneous of degree one, concave and we assume in the following that
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it is at least C2.7 We formulate the aggregate profit maximization as follows
max
(k,y,ℓ)∈D
T (k, y, ℓ) + py − rk − wℓ (5)
and we derive that for any (k, y, ℓ) ∈ intD, with intD denoting the interior
of the set D, the first order derivatives of the social production function give
T1(k, y, ℓ) = r, T2(k, y, ℓ) = −p, T3(k, y, ℓ) = w (6)
4 Competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimum
From the first welfare theorem, we know that every competitive equilibrium
obtained in the decentralized economy is a Pareto optimal allocation. Let
∆ =
{
η1, . . . , ηn|ηi ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
ηi = 1
}
be the unit simplex of Rn. A Pareto optimal allocation is a solution to the
following planner’s problem for a given vector of nonnegative welfare weights
η = (η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ ∆:
max
{xit,lit,yt}t≥0
n∑
i=1
ηi
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
ui(xit) + vi(l¯ − lit)
]
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xit = T (kt, yt, ℓt)
n∑
i=1
lit = ℓt
kt+1 = yt + (1− µ)kt
k0 given,
(7)
The solution to the above program depends on the vector η and on k0.
The set of Pareto optima is obtained when η spans ∆. As markets are
complete and under Assumptions 1 and 2, the second theorem of welfare
economics also holds: any Pareto efficient allocation can be decentralized as
a competitive equilibrium with transfer payments. We may then characterize
an equilibrium with transfer by solving the weighted dynamic optimization
7Benhabib and Nishimura [4] show that T (k, y, ℓ) is C1 under Assumption 2.
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program (7).8 A given competitive equilibrium is then obtained for a η
such that the associated allocations saturate the budget constraint of all the
consumers.
In order to simplify the analysis, we formulate the weighted dynamic
optimization program (7) in reduced form. Let U(x, ℓ) be a social utility
function such that for η = (η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ ∆
U(xt, ℓt) = max
{xit,lit}t≥0
n∑
i=1
ηi
[
ui(xit) + vi(l¯ − lit)
]
s.t
n∑
i=1
xit = xt
n∑
i=1
lit = ℓt
(8)
The value function U(x, ℓ) can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the value function of program (8) is ad-
ditively separable, i.e. U(x, ℓ) = u(x) − v(ℓ) with u(x) and v(ℓ) some C2
functions such that u′(x) > 0, v′(ℓ) > 0, u′′(x) < 0, v′′(ℓ) > 0 for any x > 0,
ℓ > 0, and limx→0 u
′(x) = +∞, limℓ→nl¯ v
′(ℓ) = +∞.
We may then define the indirect social utility function
V (kt, kt+1, ℓt) = u(T (kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ℓt))− v(ℓt) (9)
From (3), we also derive the set of admissible paths. As ℓt ≤ nl¯ and kt+1 =
yt+(1−µ)kt, we have kt+1 ≤ f
1(kt, ℓt)+(1−µ)kt ≤ f
1(kt, nl¯)+(1−µ)kt ≡
g(kt). Assumption 2 implies that there exists k˜ > 0 such that g(kt) > kt
when kt < k˜ while g(kt) < kt when kt > k˜. It follows that it is not possible
to maintain stocks beyond k˜. The set of admissible paths (kt, kt+1, ℓt) is
thus defined as follows
D˜ =
{
(kt, kt+1, ℓt) ∈ R
3
+|0 ≤ ℓt ≤ nl¯,
0 ≤ kt ≤ k˜, (1− µ)kt ≤ y ≤ f
1(kt, ℓt) + (1 − µ)kt
}
The planner’s problem is then equivalent to
8This aproach has been pioneered by Negishi [31] and applied to dynamic models by
Bewley [7] and Kehoe et al. [27] among others.
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max
{kt,ℓt}t≥0
+∞∑
t=0
δtV (kt, kt+1, ℓt)
s.t. (kt, kt+1, ℓt) ∈ D˜
k0 given
(10)
Note that the solution depends on k0.
In the present framework it is a standard result that the set of interior
Pareto optima is the set of {kt, ℓt}t≥0 that are solutions to the following
system of Euler equations
V2(kt, kt+1, ℓt) + δV1(kt+1, kt+2, ℓt+1) = 0 (11)
V3(kt, kt+1, ℓt) = 0 (12)
and that satisfy the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞
δtktV1(kt, kt+1, ℓt) = 0
Notice that using (6) and (9), the Euler equations become:
−u′(xt)pt + δu
′(xt+1) [rt+1 − (1− µ)pt+1] = 0 (13)
u′(xt)wt − v
′(ℓt) = 0 (14)
Our methodology consists in providing a local stability analysis of the
optimal path in a neighborhood of the steady state obtained as a station-
ary solution of the Euler equations. Within an optimal growth model with
heterogeneous agents, the steady state has to be considered along two di-
mensions. At the aggregate level, an interior steady state is a sequence
(kt, yt, ℓt) = (k
∗, µk∗, ℓ∗), ∀t ≥ 0 , with xt = x
∗ = T (k∗, µk∗, ℓ∗), pt = p
∗ =
−T2(k
∗, µk∗, ℓ∗), rt = r
∗ = T1(k
∗, µk∗, ℓ∗) and wt = w
∗ = T3(k
∗, µk∗, ℓ∗),
that solves the Euler equations (13)-(14). Since T (k, y, ℓ) is a linear homo-
geneous function, and denoting κ = k/ℓ, an aggregate steady state may be
also defined as a pair (κ∗, ℓ∗).
At the individual level, an interior steady state for agent i is a sequence
of consumption and labor supply (xit, lit) = (x
∗
i , l
∗
i ) that solves the first order
conditions corresponding to the individual maximization of the intertempo-
ral utility function (1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2).
Of course, the whole set of individual steady states (x∗i , l
∗
i ), i = 1, . . . , n,
satisfy x∗ =
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i and ℓ
∗ =
∑n
i=1 l
∗
i . Moreover, the endogenous trade-off
between consumption and leisure implies that these stationay values of in-
dividual consumption and labor supply depend on the initial distribution of
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capital θ = (θi)
n
i=1 with θj = 1−
∑n
i=1,i6=j θi. We then provide a comparative
statics analysis based on the consideration of an increase of some θi which
necessarily implies a decrease of some other θj, everything set equal beside.
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
i) There exists a unique aggregate steady state (κ∗, ℓ∗) which is the solu-
tion to the following pair of equations
−
T1(κ, µκ, 1)
T2(κ, µκ, 1)
= f11 (k1(κ, µκ, 1), l1(κ, µκ, 1)) = (δϑ)
−1
u′(ℓT (κ, µκ, 1))T3(κ, µκ, 1) − v
′(ℓ) = 0
with ϑ = [1− δ(1− µ)]−1.
ii) If v′i(l¯) < u
′
i((1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗θi) for any i = 1, . . . , n, there exist unique
steady state values for the individual consumptions x∗i (θ) ∈ (0, x
∗) and labor
supplies l∗i (θ) ∈ (0, ℓ
∗) that satisfy the following system
x∗i (θ) = w
∗l∗i (θ) + (1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗θi
u′i(x
∗
i (θ))w
∗ = v′i(l¯ − li(θ))
(15)
with w∗ = T3(κ
∗, µκ∗, 1), r∗ = T1(κ
∗, µκ∗, 1), ℓ∗ =
∑n
i=1 l
∗
i (θ) and x
∗ =
ℓ∗T (κ∗, µκ∗, 1) =
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i (θ).
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iii) x∗i (θ) and l
∗
i (θ) are C
1-functions of θ, for any i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover,
a variation of the share θi implies for agent i
∂x∗i (θ)
∂θi
> 0,
∂ℓ∗i (θ)
∂θi
< 0 (16)
and there is an agent j 6= i such that
∂x∗j (θ)
∂θi
< 0,
∂ℓ∗j (θ)
∂θi
> 0 (17)
Remark 1. Using the linear homogeneity of T (k, y, ℓ), we get the following
expression of the wage rate at the steady state w∗ = x∗/ℓ∗ − (1− δ)ϑr∗κ∗ .
It follows from (15) that x∗i and l
∗
i can be also expressed as functions of the
aggregate steady state values for consumption x∗ and labor ℓ∗.
9In a similar but aggregate model, Sorger [36] shows that a continuum of stationary
equilibria occurs. In our framework, as the steady state is obtained for a given set of welfare
weights η, the same result is obtained and corresponds to the existence of a stationary
equilibrium for each η ∈ ∆.
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The pair (κ∗, ℓ∗) is called the Modified Golden Rule. We may then
provide a characterization of the aggregate consumption and labor supply
(x∗, ℓ∗) which will be fundamental in the analysis of the link between wealth
inequality and macroeconomic volatility.
We introduce two elasticities characterizing the agents’ preferences: The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in individual consumption
ǫix(xi) = −u
′
i(xi)/u
′′
i (xi)xi > 0 (18)
and the elasticity of the individual labor supply with respect to wage
ǫil(li) =
dli
dw
w
li
= −v′i(l¯ − li)/v
′′
i (l¯ − li)li > 0 (19)
which is derived from the first order condition (15). From these expressions
we define the individual absolute risk tolerance indices for consumption and
labor as follows
ρi(xi) = ǫ
i
x(xi)xi, γi(li) = ǫ
i
l(li)li (20)
These are in fact the inverse of the corresponding absolute risk aversion.
Because leisure is an argument of the utility function, i.e. ǫil(li) > 0
for any i = 1, . . . , n, Theorem 1 implies that the individual decisions
(x∗i (θ), l
∗
i (θ)) and the aggregate levels of consumption and labor supply de-
pend on the initial distribution of capital. We have indeed:
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then ℓ∗ and x∗ are C1-
functions of θ, and ∂ℓ∗/∂θi > 0 if and only if
ǫjl (lj)
ǫjx(xj)
>
ǫil(li)
ǫix(xi)
(21)
Moreover, ∂x∗/∂θi = T (κ
∗, µκ∗, 1)∂ℓ∗/∂θi.
Notice however that the aggregate consumption per worked hours, χ∗ =
x∗/ℓ∗, is invariant with respect to the initial distribution of capital, i.e.
∂χ∗/∂θj = 0 .
The main conclusions of Theorem 1 are quite intuitive. An increase of
agent i’s share of capital θi generates a higher wealth and allows him to
enjoy higher consumption xi and leisure Li . As a result his labor supply is
decreased. But at the same time, when θi is increased, there must be some
other agent j for which the share of capital is decreased as
∑n
i=1 θi = 1 and
thus θj = 1−
∑n
i=1,i6=j θi. This explains why agent j has to lower his levels
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of consumption xj and leisure Lj . As a result his labor supply is increased.
This explains the result of Theorem 1-iii).
Concerning the result of Corollary 1, the intuition is the following. From
a global point of view, an increase of θi will generate larger aggregate
amounts of consumption x∗ and labor ℓ∗ if agent i’s reaction is relatively
more important with respect to consumption and relatively less important
with respect to leisure than agent j’s reaction. This property is obtained
under condition (21).
5 Endogenous competitive business cycles
Near the steady state the behavior of the non-linear dynamic system (13)-
(14) is equivalent to the behavior of the linearized system. The dynamic
properties of the steady state are then related to the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix associated with the linearized system. On the one hand,
the characteristic roots depend on the first and second order derivatives of
the social production function T (k, y, ℓ) through the relative capital intensity
difference across sectors
b(k, y, ℓ) = l
0
T
(
k1
l1
− k
0
l0
)
(22)
as well as on the elasticities of the consumption good’s output and the rental
rate with respect to the capital stock
εck(k, y, ℓ) = T1k/T > 0, εrk(k, y, ℓ) = −T11k/T1 > 0 (23)
Notice that b(k, y, ℓ) > (<)0 if and only if the investment (consumption)
good is capital intensive. As shown in Benhabib and Nishimura [5] and Bosi
et al. [9], the existence of endogenous fluctuations requires b(k, y, ℓ) < 0.
On the other hand, the characteristic roots depend on the first and
second order derivatives of the social utility function through some standard
curvature indices.
Definition 1. Let U(x, ℓ) = u(x) − v(ℓ) be the social utility function, as
defined by (8) and Lemma 1 , and ρ(x) = −u′(x)/u′′(x) > 0, γ(ℓ) =
v′(ℓ)/v′′(ℓ) > 0 be the social absolute risk tolerance respectively for con-
sumption and labor.
As shown in Wilson [38], the social absolute risk tolerance indices are
obtained from the individual ones, given by (20). The resulting expressions
are
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ρ(x) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(xi(θ)), γ(ℓ) =
n∑
i=1
γi(li(θ)) (24)
For given discount factor δ and technology parameters (b, εck, εrk), the local
stability properties of the steady state also depend on ℓ∗, ρ(ℓ∗T ∗) and γ(ℓ∗).
Notice that the model with inelastic labor can be obtained by assuming
γ(ℓ∗) = 0.
As explained in Section 4, our strategy of analysis consists in character-
izing the competitive equilibrium through the analysis of the Pareto optimal
solution of the central planner’s program (10). The equilibrium path is then
the solution to the planner’s intertermporal maximation problem, where
the planner’s utility, or social utility, is the sum of the individual utilities
weighted by the welfare weights. Consequently, the social utility function
depends on the welfare weights, which themselves depend on the equilibrium
allocations that in turn depend on the initial condition and on the distribu-
tion of individual capital endowments. This means that without regularity
properties of the welfare weights, the local stability of the steady state can-
not be obtained directly from the local stability of the planner’s optimum
with fixed welfare weights.
In fact, we have shown in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 that the aggregate
and individual steady states are continuous functions of the distribution
of capital shares θ = (θi)
n
i=1. As shown in Kehoe et al. [27] and Santos
[35], if the value function of the dynamic optimization program (10) is twice
continuously differentiable, the welfare weights are continuous functions of
θ, and the local dynamic properties of the competitive equilibrium can be
analyzed from the planner’s problem defined in terms of the social utility
function with welfare weights fixed at their steady state value. Indeed, local
stability means that with initial conditions slightly away from the steady
state, the welfare weights will be close to their steady state values. The
following Lemma gives a sufficient condition for the C2 -differentiability of
the value function of the dynamic optimization program (10) and thus for
the continuity of the welfare weights.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the welfare weights
(η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ ∆ are continuous functions of the initial individual shares
of capital θ = (θi)i=1 if for any (kt, kt+1, ℓt) ∈ intD:
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T2(kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ℓt)
+ b(kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ℓt)T1(kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ℓt) 6= 0
(25)
A sufficient condition for (25) to hold is b(kt, kt+1 − (1 − µ)kt, ℓt) ≤ 0, i.e.
the consumption good is capital intensive.
From (24) and Proposition 1 we derive that ρ(x) and γ(ℓ) are continuous
functions of the initial individual shares of capital θ = (θi)
n
i=1. As a direct
consequence, we finally conclude that the dynamic properties of the com-
petitive equilibrium can be analyzed from the planner’s problem defined in
terms of the social utility function with fixed welfare weights.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, let condition (25) hold. Then
the stability properties of the steady state of the general equilibrium model
with equilibrium welfare weights and of the optimal growth model with ap-
propriate fixed welfare weights are equivalent.
Building on Proposition 2, we consider from now on capital intensity
configurations under which condition (25) is satisfied and we pursue our
analysis of the equilibrium path of the optimal growth model with welfare
weights fixed at their steady state values. Our objective is to derive a
relationship between the local dynamical properties of the equilibrium path
in a neighborhood of the steady state and the degree of inequality in the
economy referering to the distribution of capital across agents.
As we will measure wealth inequality through the vector θ of shares of
capital and since the stability properties of the steady state depend on the
absolute risk tolerence indices (as well as on technology) it is useful to define
the bounds of the intervals of the admissible values for ρ(x) and γ(ℓ) when
the distribution of individual capital shares θi spans the feasible set. Let
ρ = min
θ
ρ(x∗(θ)), ρ¯ = max
θ
ρ(x∗(θ)), γ = min
θ
γ(ℓ∗(θ)), γ¯ = max
θ
γ(ℓ∗(θ))
We then have by definition ρ(x∗(θ)) ∈ (ρ, ρ¯), γ(ℓ∗(θ)) ∈ (γ, γ¯). As we will
see there are many situations in which these bounds nay be computed.
We are now ready to relate the stability of the steady state with the
absolute risk tolerance indices. However, first we analyse the role of tech-
nology. As shown in Bosi et al. [9], the existence of endogenous fluctuations
in a two-sector optimal growth model with elastic labor requires a capital
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intensive consumption good with b ∈ (−1/(1 − µ), 0). The intuition for
this fact, initially provided by Benhabib and Nishimura (1985), is based on
the Rybczinsky theorem: an instantaneous increase in the capital stock kt
implies a decrease of the output of the capital good yt which lowers the
investment and the capital stock in the next period kt+1. But, from the
same mechanism, this decrease of kt+1 implies an increase of the output of
the capital good yt+1 which increases the investment and the capital stock
in period t + 2, kt+2. Fluctuations of the capital stocks are obtained if
this mechanism is strong enough with respect to the depreciation rate of
capital.10 It is worth noticing that the restriction on the capital intensity
difference across sectors appears to be compatible with recent empirical ev-
idences. Building on aggregate Input-Output tables, Takahashi et al. [37]
have shown that over the last 30 years the OECD countries are characterized
by a more capital intensive consumption good sector than the investment
good sector.
The properties of preference also matter in the existence of fluctuations
via the absolute risk tolerence indices. Indeed, the existence of persistent
fluctuations requires two main ingredients. On the one hand, the agents
have to accept fluctuations in their consumption levels and thus need a
large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, i.e. a
large enough absolute risk tolerance with respect to consumption. On the
other hand, as labor is supplied endogenously a low enough elasticity of the
labor supply, i.e. a low enough absolute risk tolerance with respect to labor,
is necessary in order to prevent the agents from smoothing the fluctuations
of their wage and capital incomes implied by the fluctuations of the capital
stock.
The following two Propositions are adapted from Proposition 4 in Bosi
et al. [9] and will be the basis for our main results stated in the next Section.
The first one deals with the existence of damped fluctuations. Consider the
following two critical values for ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗):
ρc = −
δϑ2εckx
∗
b[1+(1−µ)b]εrk
≡ Λcx
∗
γc = −
1−s
s
“
1
1−µb
”2
[(1−δ)ϑ+ 1−ss ]b[1+(1−µ)b]h
1−s
s
b
1−µb
+δϑ
ih
1−s
s
1+(1−µ)b
1−µb
+ϑ
i [ρ(x∗)− ρc] ≡ Γc [ρ(x∗)− ρc]
(26)
10From the capital accumulation equation in (7), we easily get dkt+1/dkt = b
−1+1−µ.
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and assume b ∈ (−1/(1 − µ),−1/(2 − µ)] ∪ [−δ/(1 + δ(1 − µ)), 0) so that
ρc > 0, and γc > 0 for ρ(x
∗) > ρc.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, let the consumption good be
capital intensive with b ∈ (−1/(1− µ),−1/(2− µ)] ∪ [−δ/(1 + δ(1− µ)), 0).
1. If ρ(x∗) < ρc, then for any γ(ℓ
∗) ∈ (γ, γ¯), the steady state is saddle-
point stable with monotone convergence.
2. If ρ(x∗) > ρc, then the steady state is saddle-point stable with mono-
tone convergence when γ(ℓ∗) > γc while it is is saddle-point stable with
oscillating convergence when γ(ℓ∗) < γc.
Notice that the existence of damped fluctuations requires ρc < ρ¯ and
γc ∈ (γ, γ¯).
The second Proposition focusses on the existence of persistent oscilla-
tions. Let us introduce the following additional critical value:
ρf = −
2δ(1+δ)ϑ2εckx
∗
[1+(2−µ)b]
[
δ+[1+(1−µ)δ]b
]
εrk
≡ Λfx
∗
γf = −
1−s
s
“
1
1−µb
”2
[(1−δ)ϑ+ 1−ss ][1+(2−µ)b][δ+b(1+δ(1−µ))]h
1−s
s
1+(2−µ)b
1−µb
+(1+δ)ϑ
ih
1−s
s
δ+b(1+δ(1−µ))
1−µb
+2δϑ
i [ρ(x∗)− ρf ]
≡ Γf [ρ(x
∗)− ρf ]
(27)
and assume b ∈ (−1/(2 − µ),−δ/(1 + δ(1 − µ))) so that 0 < ρc < ρf , and
0 < γf < γc when ρ(x
∗) > ρf .
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, let the consumption good be
capital intensive with b ∈ (−1/(2 − µ),−δ/(1 + δ(1 − µ))).
1. If ρ(x∗) < ρc, then for any γ(ℓ
∗) ∈ (γ, γ¯), the steady state is saddle-
point stable with monotone convergence.
2. If ρ(x∗) ∈ (ρc, ρf ), then the steady state is saddle-point stable with
monotone convergence when γ(ℓ∗) > γc while it is is saddle-point stable with
oscillating convergence when γ(ℓ∗) < γc.
3. If ρ(x∗) > ρf , then the steady state is saddle-point stable with mono-
tone convergence when γ(ℓ∗) > γc, saddle-point stable with oscillating con-
vergence when γ(ℓ∗) ∈ (γf , γc) and becomes locally unstable with oscillating
divergence when γ(ℓ∗) < γf . Moreover, γf is a flip bifurcation value and
there generically exist period-two cycles, in a left (or right) neighborhood of
γf , which are saddle-point stable (or unstable).
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Notice that ρf < ρ¯ and γf ∈ (γ, γ¯) are necessary conditions for the
existence of persistent oscillations.
6 The role of wealth inequality on output volatil-
ity
In this section we explore the link between wealth inequality and stabil-
ity. Focussing on inequality rises two issues. The first concerns the eco-
nomic variable under consideration. In the model, the primitives are the
shares in initial capital, hour endowments and preferences. However, the
relationship between these fundamentals and individual wealth at equilib-
rium is not straightforward because of the role of labor supply. Strictly
speaking, consumers use their income to buy the consumption good and
to consume leisure time. As time discount is identical across individuals,
their consumption along the steady state is a good representation of indi-
vidual wealth. Furthermore, in the present model commodity prices, inter-
est rates and wages are independent of the distribution of capital shares,
a property that greatly simplifies the computations. Formaly, the individ-
ual consumption is implicitly defined by equations (15). It follows that
along the steady state the individual wealth Ωi(θ) of an agent i is given by
Ωi(θ) =
∑∞
t=0 δ
txi
∗(θ) = 11−δ (w
∗l∗i (θ) + (1 − δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗(θ)θi) ≡ φi(θ), i.e. it
depends on the individual labor supply and the steady state values of aggre-
gate labor which themselves depend on the vector of shares θ. Consequently,
the distribution of the initial shares of capital θ = (θi)
n
i=1 determines com-
pletely the distribution of individual wealth Ω = (Ωi(θ))
n
i=1. The notions of
inequality in wealth or in shares of capital will then be used equivalently.
The second issue concerns the characterization of inequality. On the ba-
sis of Propositions 3 and 4, we need a measure of wealth inequality which
can be linked with the steady state values of the absolute risk tolerance
indices ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗). As the steady state values x∗ and ℓ∗ are functions
of the distribution θ = (θi)
n
i=1, we then consider a simple definition of in-
creasing inequality based on the distribution of shares of capital and on the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Definition 2. Assume that the n agents are ordered according to their ini-
tial share of capital in decreasing order, i.e. θi ≥ θj for i < j. Con-
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sider a benchmark economy A characterized by a distribution θA = (θAk )
n
k=1.
There is a larger inequality in some economy B if the associated distribu-
tion θB = (θBk )
n
k=1 is such that θ
A
i < θ
B
i and θ
A
j > θ
B
j for some agents i, j
such that j > i, while for the remaining agents k 6= i, j, θk is unaffected.
Such a case in which economy A is less unequal than economy B is denoted
θA ≺I θ
B.
We consider bi-lateral transfers between two agents i, j in which agent i,
who owns intially a larger share of capital than agent j, ends up holding an
even larger share while agent j, who initially owns a lower share of capital,
ends up with an even lower share. Notice also that the transfers are mean-
preserving so that the two distributions θA = (θAk )
n
k=1 and θ
B = (θBk )
n
k=1
may be easily compared.
The fact that wealth inequality may have an effect on macroeconomic
volatility is a consequence of Propositions 3 and 4. Indeed, as shown by
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, a modification of the distribution of shares of
capital θ implies modifications of ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗). Then the local stability
properties of the steady state are affected by changes in the wealth distri-
bution provided ρ(x∗), ρc and ρf on the one hand, and γ(ℓ
∗), γc and γf on
the other hand, are changed at the same rate. In fact, the critical values
ρc, ρf , γc, γf are not constant but are linear functions of x
∗ and ℓ∗ respec-
tively. In the optimal growth literature (see Benhabib and Nishimura [5])
this fact generates the usual difficulty that the conditions for local stability
or for the occurrence of cycles are implicit. In the present analysis, this
fact allows for the existence of a correlation between wealth inequality and
instability provided the social absolute risk tolerance indices ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗)
are not linear functions of x∗ and ℓ∗. The difficulty is that the curvature
of these indices involves the third and fourth order derivatives of the utility
function, which are not limited by the standard assumptions on preferences.
However, an important point is that the non linearity of the social abso-
lute risk tolerance indices ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗) does not requires the non lineariry
of the individual absolute risk tolerance indices. Building on Wilson [38],
Hara et al. [25] have recently provided a characterization of the curvature
properties of the social absolute risk tolerance index for consumption. Ap-
plied to our formulation and recalling from Remark 1 that the individual
stationary values for consumption x∗i are functions of the aggregate con-
sumption level x∗, we get from formula (24):
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Proposition 5. (Hara et al. [25]) The curvature of the social absolute risk
tolerance with respect to consumption is given by
ρ′′(x) =
n∑
i=1
(
∂xi
∂x
)2
ρ′′i (xi) +
1
ρ(x)
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂x
[
ρ′i(xi)− ρ
′(x)
]2
(28)
with
ρ′(x) =
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂x
ρ′i(xi) (29)
A similar conclusion is obviously obtained for the social absolute risk
tolerance with respect to labor. This result shows that non linear social
indices are obtained either when the individual indices are themselves non
linear, or when there is some heterogeneity in agents’ preferences. We thus
introduce the following additional Assumption on individual preferences:
Assumption 3. Either agents have homogeneous preferences characterized
by non-linear ρi(xi) and γi(li), or agents have heterogeneous preferences.
Assumption 3 is not trully restrictive as we know that with homogeneous
preferences leading to linear ρi and γi, inequality has no effect on stability.
Building on Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we need also to introduce condi-
tions that characterize the relationship between the aggregate steady state
and the distribution of individual wealth. Consider the bound Λj and Γj,
j = c, f , defined by (26) and (27), and let us denote Υj = ΓjT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λj ].
Definition 3. Let (Ψ,Φ) ∈ {(Λc,Υc), (Λf ,Υf )} be given. Agents i and j
are said to be elasticity-ordered if and only if one of the following sets of
conditions hold:
i) ǫjl (lj)/ǫ
j
x(xj) < ǫ
i
l(li)/ǫ
i
x(xi), ρ
′(x∗) < Ψ and γ′(ℓ∗) > Φ,
ii) ǫjl (lj)/ǫ
j
x(xj) > ǫ
i
l(li)/ǫ
i
x(xi), ρ
′(x∗) > Ψ and γ′(ℓ∗) < Φ.
Conditions i) and ii) are motivated by the result in Corrolary 1. They ensure
that the aggregate labor supply is a decreasing or an increasing function of
the share of capital θi owned by agent i and thus require different properties
for the slopes of ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗). We will then consider a transfer between
agents i and j with i < j, i.e. θi > θj. As θ = (θi)
n
i=1 with θj = 1 −∑n
k=1,k 6=j θk, this transfer will be such that the new distribution of capital
shares is θ˜ = (θ˜i)
n
i=1 with θ˜i = θi + ǫ, θ˜j = θj − ǫ and ǫ > 0.
11
11Notice that many transfers may be considered consecutively.
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In order to simplify the formulation, we now introduce two different types
of assumption concerning the capital intensity difference that are based on
Propositions 3 and 4.
Assumption 4. The consumption good is capital intensive with b ∈
(−1/(1− µ),−1/(2− µ)] ∪ [−δ/(1 + δ(1− µ)), 0), (Ψ,Φ) = (Λc,Υc), ρc < ρ¯
and γc ∈ (γ, γ¯).
Assumption 5. The consumption good is capital intensive with b ∈
(−1/(2− µ),−δ/(1 + δ(1− µ))), (Ψ,Φ) = (Λf ,Υf ), ρf < ρ¯ and γf ∈ (γ, γ¯).
Moreover, γf is a flip bifurcation value giving rise to saddle-point stable
period-two cycles in its left neighborhood.
Assumption 4 is linked to the existence of damped fluctuations while
Assumption 5 concerns the occurrence of persistent fluctuations. Although
this last assumption concerns non trivial restrictions on the non-linear part
of the Euler equation, a number of robust examples of saddle-point stable
period-two cycles have been provided by Boldrin and Deneckere [8] and
Mitra and Nishimura [28].
The following Theorem is the most general result of the paper. It shows
that under the stated conditions a sufficiently high level of wealth inequality
leads to endogenous business cycle fluctuations in a neighborhood of the
steady state.
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, together with either As-
sumption 4 or Assumption 5. Let ≺RI be the restriction of ≺I to the pairs
of elasticity-ordered agents according to Definition 3. Then there exists a
distribution θ0 such that one of the following cases holds:
1 - If Assumption 4 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with monotone convergence for any economy E such that θE ≺RI θ
0 and is
saddle-point stable with oscillations otherwise.
2 - If Assumption 5 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with oscillating convergence for any economy E such that θE ≺RI θ
0 and is
unstable with oscillating divergence otherwise. Moreover, there generically
exist saddle-point stable period-two cycles for any economy E characterized
by a distribution θE in a right neighborhood of θ0.
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The results contained in the previous theorem are at the same time very
general and specific. They can be viewed as general as no restriction is im-
posed on the distribution of wealth and both technology and preferences are
not bound to belong to any given analytical class, as for example we do not
impose them to be CES. They are also specific in the sense that the restric-
tion to redistributions satisfying the property formalised in Definition 3 is
necessary because we state the result without specifying the set of feasible
wealth distributions. In fact, this condition is not necessary when individual
wealth follows a Pareto distribution.
In the following two Sections we will sharpen our results by imposing
reasonable restrictions on the fundamentals. The next Section restricts the
attention to Pareto distributed individual wealth and preferences giving rise
to individual absolute tolerance to risk which are not linear. The second
next Section deals with the case in which the absolute tolerance to risk are
linear. In this case, a preference heterogeneity is necessary, even in a very
mild form, but the conclusions hold independently of the wealth distribution.
Finally, note that the results in Theorem 2 are obtained provided the
stated conditions on absolute risk tolerance index for consumption ρ(x∗)
hold. This is important in respect with two recent contributions. First,
as shown in Calvet et al. [12],12 an increasing social absolute risk toler-
ance ρ(x) is obtained when the individual absolute risk tolerance indices
are increasing.13 Second, Guiso and Paiella [24] have provided an empirical
investigation of the absolute risk tolerance. They use household survey data
to construct a direct measure of absolute risk tolerance based on the maxi-
mum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky security. They relate
this measure to consumers’s endowment and attributes, and to measures
of background risk and liquidity constraints. They find that risk tolerance
is an increasing function of endowment. Theorem 2 then shows that with
some appropriate restrictions on the slopes of ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗) which are
compatible with standard positive individual elasticities of intertemporal
substitution in consumption and of the labor supply, more wealth inequality
generates more macroeconomic volatility.
12See also equation (29) in Proposition 5.
13Using (15) in Theorem 1 and Remark 1, and applying the same methodology as in
Appendix 11.2 (proof of Theorem 1), it is easy to show that ∂xi/∂x > 0 and ∂li/∂ℓ > 0
for any i = 1, . . . , n.
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7 The role of inequality when wealth is Pareto dis-
tributed
The analysis presented so far holds for arbitrary distributions of shares in
initial capital. However, there is strong empirical evidence that income and
wealth distributions follow specific patterns and that these are persistent.
In the case of the US economy, over the last century the data are character-
ized by skewed distributions of income and wealth with relatively large top
shares,14 and with heavy upper tails (power law behavior).15 Building on
these characteristics, in this Section we restrict the analysis to the family of
Pareto wealth distributions and investigate the effect of increasing inequal-
ities on the dynamics within this familly. Pareto wealth distributions are
common choices as they are skewed to the right, display a heavy upper tail
(slowly declining top wealth shares) and are very concentrated.
In the case of Pareto distributed wealth a useful result is that the Gini
index G is connected to the exponent α of the Pareto distribution by
G = 12α−1
Therefore, within this class of wealth distributions, large values of α corre-
spond to more equal societies. Estimates of G vary greatly depending on
the country and on the used data set. For the US in the 90’s some studies
indicate a Gini index as high as 0.78. Across countries the Gini index typi-
cally varies between 0.2 for very equal societies to 0.8 for unequal societies.
These bounds on G imply a range for α, α = 12G +
1
2 ∈ [1.125, 3], where the
upper bound is for the most unequal societies. As the degree of inequality
is directly given by the Gini index G throughout the parameter α, our aim
is then to show that variations of α imply variations of the absolute risk
tolerance indices ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗).
It should be noted that while Pareto distributions appear to cover some
stylized facts characterizing the data, there are however several issues related
to this specific choice. First, Pareto distributions are not a good represen-
tation of the empirical distribution for low values of individual wealths. For
the low wealth region, log-normal distributions provide a better fit. A sec-
ond problem is that Pareto distributions have unbounded support, a fact
14See Piketty and Saez [33], Wolff [39, 40].
15See Nirei and Souma [32].
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that generates a bias when compared to the data. Finally, a third set of
issues concern whether the variable is continuous or discrete and whether
it is assumed that the population is finite and countable or not. As the
present model is specified for a discrete and finite set of individuals, we need
to focus on the discrete version of the Pareto distribution, which is the Zeta
distribution. In this case, the variable itself is also discretized.
7.1 The Zeta distribution and its implementation
The discrete version of the Pareto distribution is the Zeta distribution. Note
that for a discrete random variable, the associated probability measure µ
has a countable support S = {x1, x2, ...} and µ is completely determined by
µ(x1), µ(x2), .... In the case of the Zeta distribution S is normalized in a way
such that S = {1, 2, 3, ...}
Definition 4. The Zeta distribution is characterized by the probability mea-
sure µ defined for natural values s ∈ N with µ(s) = s
−αP∞
j=1 j
−α .
We will assume that the true distribution of wealth is a Zeta distribution
in which the support S is obtained by letting s = wwmin where w is individual
wealth and wmin the minimum of w, i.e. the subsistence level of wealth.
This implies that wealth can only take values which are multiples of wmin.
The model of the present paper involves a countable and finite population
n. This implies that only integer values of µ(s)n can be modeled. However,
in the sequel we show that for a sufficiently large population n, the Zeta
distribution can be approximated by a distribution µ̂ (of finite support) with
integer values of µ̂(s)n for all s. We also show that this distribution can be
decentralized, i.e. it is implementable. Consider the following definition.
Definition 5. Let µ be the probability measure associated to the Zeta dis-
tribution. Let Γn be the distribution with probability measure ηn such that
when µ(s)n /∈ N∗, ηn(s) is defined by the condition |µ(s)− ηn(s)| < 1/2n
with ηn(s)n ∈ N
∗, and when µ(s)n ∈ N∗, ηn(s) = µ(s).
For sufficiently large populations, Γn is a good approximation to the
original Zeta distribution. Indeed, if we consider the sequence of economies
indexed by their population n and characterized by a measure ηn we get:
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Lemma 2. The sequence of distributions Γn of measure ηn converges to the
distribution of measure µ, i.e. limn→∞ |µ(s)− ηn(s)| = 0 for all s.
The previous results implies the following.
Corollary 2. For any (xmin, α, ǫ, ε) with xmin > 0, 0 < α < 1, ǫ > 0, ε > 0,
there exists n0 such that for any n > n0, there exists a distribution Γ = Γn
of measure η = ηn such that nη(s) only takes integer values for all s ∈ N and
which is ǫ-close to the original Zeta distribution, i.e. ‖η − µ‖ < ǫ, where ‖.‖
is the weak (pointwise) norm for distributions. Furthermore, the associated
Gini index is ε-close to 1/(2α − 1) :∣∣∣G(Γ)− 12α−1 ∣∣∣ < ε
The final issue is wether the distribution η can be implemented. We obtain
the following conclusion
Lemma 3. The distribution Γ of measure η obtained in Corollary 2 corre-
sponds to a feasible finite sequence of individual endowments in initial capital
θ, with
∑n
i=1 θi free but finite.
We may then consider that the distribution of individual wealth follows
with a sufficiently high level of approximation a Zeta distribution. As noted
above, along the steady state the distribution of wealth and the distribution
of individual consumption are identical.
Assumption 6. Individual wealth is distributed according to a Zeta distri-
bution of support S = {wmin, 2wmin, 3wmin, ...}
7.2 Inequality, Gini index and endogenous fluctuations
In order to obtain clear results we assume that agents are homogeneous
with respect to their utility function and we focus on a specific class of
preferences which corresponds to the slightest deviation with respect to the
CRRA formulation.
Assumption 7. Individual preferences are such that individual absolute
risk tolerance indices regarding consumption and leisure are of the form
ρi(xi) = −
u′i(xi)
u′′i (xi)
=
xϕi
σ and γi(li) = −
v′i(Li)
v′′i (Li)
= (l¯−Li)
ν
γ =
lνi
γ
with σ, ϕ, γ, ν > 0 and where Li = l − li is individual leisure.
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The class of preferences generating such individual risk tolerances is large
and includes the CES (or CRRA) utility function. In fact a sufficient con-
dition is that
u′i(xi) = exp
(
−σ
x1−ϕi
1−ϕ
)
and v′i(Li) = exp
(
γ (l¯−Li)
1−ν
1−ν
)
(30)
For consumption, when ϕ < 1 individual absolute risk tolerance ρi(xi) is a
strictly concave function while for ϕ > 1, ρi(xi) is a strictly convex. When
ϕ 6= 1 and according to Gollier [23], the most plausible value for σ is σ = 2.
The CRRA specification is obtained when ϕ = 1. In this case x1−ϕi /(1− ϕ)
becomes log xi and u
′
i(xi) = exp(−σ log xi) = x
−σ
i . The associated utility
function is then ui(xi) = x
1−σ
i /(1 − σ). A similar expression holds for the
utility of leisure. As a result, choosing values for ϕ and ν close enough to
one allows to consider individual absolute risk tolerance indices arbitarily
close to the linear formulation characterizing CRRA utility functions.
From Assumption 6 normalized incomes follow a Zeta distribution. As
noted before, along the steady state we have xi = ωi so that normalized
individual consumption x˜i = xi/xmin also follows a Zeta distribution. The
associated value of ρ(x) is
ρ(x) =
xϕmin
σ
ζ(α−ϕ)
ζ(α) = ρ¯(α) (31)
where ζ(α) =
∑∞
s=1 s
−α is the Riemann Zeta function. Notice that to ensure
a finite value for ζ(α−ϕ) we need to assume α > 1+ϕ. From the distribution
of consumption we compute the risk tolerance to leisure as follows
γ(ℓ) =
x
1−ϕ
1−ν ν
min
γ
[
ν−1
γ(1−ϕ) [σ − (1− ϕ)wˆ]
] ν
1−ν ζ(α+
1−ϕ
ν−1
ν)
ζ(α) ≡ γ¯(α)
(32)
with wˆ = logw and w as defined in (6). As soon as (ν − 1)(1 − ϕ)[σ −
(1 − ϕ)wˆ] > 0, the functions ρ¯(α) and γ¯(α) are respectively decreasing and
increasing in α. As inequalities increase when α decreases, we conclude that
ρ(x∗) = ρ¯(α) and γ(ℓ∗) = γ¯(α) are respectively increasing and decreasing
functions of the level of inequality.
If the technologies are such that Assumption 4 or 5 holds, we then derive
the following result:
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 2, 6 and 7 hold, together with either As-
sumption 4, or Assumption 5. Assume also that (1 − ϕ)wˆ ≤ 0 , α > 1 + ϕ
and (ν − 1)(1 − ϕ) > 0. Then there exists σ¯ > 0, α¯ > 1 + ϕ and a level
of wealth inequality characterized by a Gini index G¯ = 1/(2α¯− 1) such that
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when σ ∈ (0, σ¯), one of the following cases holds:
1 - If Assumption 4 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with monotone convergence for any economy E such that GE < G¯ and is
saddle-point stable with oscillations otherwise.
2 - If Assumption 5 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with oscillating convergence for any economy E such that GE < G¯ and is
unstable otherwise. Moreover, there generically exist period-two cycles, in a
right neighborhood of G¯, which are saddle-point stable.
Theorem 3 improves the results of Theorem 2 when wealth is Pareto
distributed. Importantly, we drop any restriction on the set of agents where
the redistributions can take place. We provide in this particular case clear-
cut conditions on the level of wealth inequality to get endogenous business
cycle fluctuations. We show indeed that an increase of the Gini index implies
the occurrence of macroeconomic volatility. Of course such a result is based
on a large enough individual elasticity of intertemporal substitution xϕ−1i /σ
as each consumer has to accept fluctuations of his consumption level.
Notice that if ϕ = 1, i.e. if the utility function is of the CES type with
respect to consumption, the expression (56) no longer depends on α, while
if ν = 1, i.e. if the utility function is of the CES type with respect to leisure,
the expression (56) is equal to zero as limν→1 ζ(α + (1 − ϕ)ν/(ν − 1)) = 1.
Therefore, when (ν−1)(1−ϕ) = 0 the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations
no longer depends on the degree of inequality. As the nature of the results
does not depend on whether ϕ, ν < 1 or ϕ, ν > 1, the problem occurring at
ϕ = 1 or ν = 1 can be considered as a discontinuity corresponding to the
fact that Assumption 3 is not satisfied. It is worth pointing out however
that Theorem 3 still holds for any values of ϕ or ν arbitrarily close to one.
8 The role of inequality with heterogeneous CES
preferences
In Section 7, we have shown that large enough inequalities generate macroe-
conomic volatility when wealth is distributed in the economy according to a
Pareto distribution and the common utility function of each agent is charac-
terized by non linear individual risk tolerance to fluctuations in consumption
and leisure. However, these results do not apply to CES utility functions be-
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cause in this case risk tolerance is linear. In the current Section, we consider
a general distribution of wealth and introduce a mild heterogeneity across
agents concerning preferences. We then show that large enough inequalities
may generate macroeconomic volatility even with CES utility functions.
We assume that consumer i’s intertemporal utility function is given by
U(xi,Li) =
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
x1−σiit
1− σi
−
(l¯ − Lit)
1+γi
1 + γi
]
(33)
with δ ∈ (0, 1), σi ≥ 0 and γi ≥ 0. Consequently, ρi(xi) = xi/σi and
γi(li) = li/γi, with li = l¯ − Li. Notice that the individual absolute risk
tolerance indices are increasing functions of consumption and labor. As
mentioned previously (see footnote 13 ), it is easy to show that ∂xi/∂x > 0
and ∂li/∂ℓ > 0 for any i = 1, . . . , n, and Proposition 5 implies that the
aggregate absolute risk tolerance indices are also increasing functions of
consumption and labor.
We consider the simple case in which except agent 1, all the other n− 1
agents have identical preferences. More precisely, agent 1 is characterized
by the pair of parameters’ values (σ1, γ1), while each agent j = 2, . . . , n
is characterized by the common pair (σj , γj) = (σ, γ). We also assume
that all agents j = 2, . . . , n own the same share of capital θ2 while agent
1 owns a share θ1 > θ2. For a given share θ1 ∈ (1/n, 1), we thus derive
θ2 = (1− θ1)/(n − 1).
The aggregate absolute risk tolerance indices are such that
ρ′(x) = ∂x1∂x
1
σ1
+ ∂x2∂x
n−1
σ > 0 γ
′(ℓ) = ∂l1∂ℓ
1
γ1
+ ∂l2∂ℓ
n−1
γ > 0
It follows that for given values of (σ1, γ1) and a given set of technologies
leading to the bounds (Ψ,Φ), appropriate choices of (σ, γ) allow to satisfy
one of the two cases of the conditions reated to Definition 3 and thus show
that an increase of wealth inequality may generate macroeconomic volatility.
However, in order to prove that all the conditions of Theorem 2 may be
satisfied, we need to specify a set of production functions.
Following Nishimura et al. [29] and Nishimura and Venditti [30], let us
consider CES technologies such that
y0 =
(
α0l
1−1/ς
0 + α1k
1−1/ς
0
)ς/(ς−1)
, y1 =
(
β0l
1−1/ς
1 + β1k
1−1/ς
1
)ς/(ς−1)
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with α0 + α1 = β0 + β1 = 1. Both sectors are characterized by the same
elasticity of capital-labor substitution ς > 0. In order to simplify the formu-
lation, we assume that the capital stock fully depreciates within one period,
i.e. µ = 1. We have also to impose the following restriction
ς >
(
1 + lnβ1lnδ
)−1
≡ ςˆ ∈ (0, 1)
in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the steady state values for
the capital-labor ratio κ∗ and the consumption per capita T ∗ = T (κ∗, κ∗, 1).
In order to show that the local stability of the steady state is modified
when the degree of wealth inequality is increased, i.e. when the value of θ1
is increased, we provide illustrations for each of the cases 1- and 2- exhibited
in Theorem 2. In the following results, we define an economy as a 8-uple
of parameters (α1, β1, ς, δ, σ1, γ1, σ, γ). Following Propositions 3 and 4, we
have to assume that the consumption good sector is capital intensive, namely
α1/α0 > β1/β0.
The next Proposition deals with the correlation between wealth inequal-
ity and the existence of damped oscillations.
Proposition 6. There exist a non-empty set of values of n and an open set
of economies (α1, β1, ς, δ, σ1, γ1, σ, γ) with ς > 1, 1 > σ1 > σ and γ > 1 > γ1,
such that case 1- in Theorem 2 holds. Then, a sufficiently high level of wealth
inequality leads to the existence of damped fluctuations in the neighborhood
of the steady state.
The following Proposition finally deals with the correlation between
wealth inequality and the existence of persistent fluctuations.
Proposition 7. There exist a non-empty set of values of n and an open set
of economies (α1, β1, ς, δ, σ1, γ1, σ, γ) with ς > 1, σ1 > 1 > σ and γ > γ1 ≥ 1,
such that case 2- in Theorem 2 holds. Then, a sufficiently high level of wealth
inequality leads to the existence of period-two cycles in the neighborhood of
the steady state.
Persistent fluctuations, i.e. the occurrence of saddle-point stable period-
two cycles, is obtained if the flip bifurcation is super-critical, i.e. if the second
part of Assumption 5 holds. In such a case, Proposition 7 shows that a low
level of wealth inequality is associated to the existence of damped fluctu-
ations in the neighborhood of the steady state, and an increase of wealth
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inequality will lead to the occurrence of persistent fluctuations. Although
the second part of Assumption 5 corresponds to non-trivial conditions on
the non-linear part of the Euler equation, a number of robust examples pro-
vided in the literature on optimal growth show that these conditions are
usually satisfied.16
Propositions 6 and 7 then show that as soon as heterogeneous preferences
are considered, a positive correlation between wealth inequality and business
cycle fluctuations can be exhibited. Importantly, this can happpen even
with increasing individual absolute risk tolerance in accordance with recent
empirical findings by Guiso and Paiella [24].
9 The case with inelastic labor: comparisons and
further results
In Ghiglino and Venditti [22], we have considered a similar two-sector op-
timal growth model but with inelastic labor. In such a framework, the
aggregate amount of labor is normalized to 1 and each agent has a fixed
endowment of labor li such that
∑n
i=1 li = 1. Consumer i’s preferences are
then characterized by a discounted utility function of the form
U i(xi) =
∞∑
t=0
δtui(xit)
with ui(xi) satisfying the corresponding part of Assumption 1 . If we con-
sider the individual elasticities of the labor supply with respect to wage as
defined by (19), assuming inelastic labor supplies yields ǫil(li) = 0 for any
i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that the individual and social absolute risk toler-
ance indices for labor as defined by (20) and (24) are equal to zero, i.e.
γi(li) = γ(ℓ) = 0. A straightforward modification of Theorem 1 then gives
the individual steady states as follows
xi
∗(x∗, θi) = li [x
∗ − (1− δ)ϑT ∗1 k
∗] + (1− δ)ϑT ∗1 k
∗θi (34)
where x∗ = T (k∗, µk∗, 1) ≡ T ∗ is the aggregate consumption which is now
independent from the distribution of wealth. Notice that the consumption
level x∗i of agent i only depends on the individual share of capital θi while
in the case of endogenous labor, x∗i depends on the whole distribution of
shares θ = (θi)
n
i=1.
16See for instance Boldrin and Deneckere [8] and Mitra and Nishimura [28].
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As the continuity of the welfare weights when labor is inelastic is obtained
under the same condition given in Proposition 1, simple modifications of
Propositions 3 and 4 when γ(ℓ) is set equal to 0 provide conditions for the
existence of damped and persistent fluctuations. Consider indeed the critical
bounds ρc and ρf respectively given by (26) and (27):
i) When b ∈ (−1/(1−µ),−1/(2−µ)]∪ [−δ/(1+ δ(1−µ)), 0), the steady
state is saddle-point stable with oscillations if ρ(x∗) > ρc.
ii) When b ∈ (−1/(2−µ),−δ/(1 + δ(1−µ))), the steady state is saddle-
point stable with oscillating convergence if ρ(x∗) ∈ (ρc, ρf ) with ρf a flip
bifurcation value, and there generically exist period-two cycles, in a right
(or left) neighborhood of ρf , which are saddle-point stable (or unstable).
As in the case with endogenous labor, we now show that a positive corre-
lation between wealth inequality an macroeconomic volatility can be easily
obtained in two basic configurations: either when agents have heterogeneous
preferences characterized by a linear absolute risk tolerance index under a
general unspecified distribution of wealth, or when agents have homogeneous
preferences characterized by a nonlinear absolute risk tolerance index under
a Pareto distribution of wealth.
9.1 Preferences heterogeneity and output volatility
Although the aggregate consumption level is independent of the initial dis-
tribution of wealth when labor is inelastic, a modification of the degree of
inequality based on bi-lateral transfers may still have an effect on the ag-
gregate value of the absolute risk tolerance index ρ(x∗). Indeed, building
on (24) and the criteria introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz [34], Ghiglino
and Venditti [22] show that a rise of the degree of inequality characterizing
the distribution of capital shares θ = (θi)
n
i=1 increases the value of ρ(x
∗)
provided this function is strictly convex. As the local stability properties of
the optimal path depend on the value of ρ(x∗), this implies that sufficiently
high levels of wealth inequality lead to endogenous fluctuations in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state if the social absolute risk tolerance ρ(x) is a
strictly convex function.
These conclusions a priori suffer from a strong limitation. Indeed, re-
strictions on the curvature of the aggregate absolute risk tolerance index
refer to the fourth order derivative of utility functions, and except weak
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indirect evidence given for instance by Gollier [23], the literature does not
provide a clear characterization of the sign of this derivative. From this
point of view, the conclusions obtained in Theorem 2 under elastic labor ap-
pear to be more powerful as they only refer to the third derivatives of utility
functions which have been recently characterized on empirical ground.17
However, Proposition 5 implies that a convex social absolute risk toler-
ance index is obtained even when the individual indices are linear as soon as
there is some heterogeneity of preferences across agents. As an illustration
of this last case, consider the class of preferences given by a HARA utility
function such that
ui(xi) =
1−σi
σi
(
aixi
1−σi
+ ei
)σi
(35)
with ai > 0, ei ≥ 0, σi > 0. The associated individual absolute risk tolerance
is then
ρi(xi) =
xi
1−σi
+ eiai
As shown in Ghiglino and Venditti [22], if all agents have homogeneous
HARA preferences with (ai, ei, σi) = (a, e, σ), the social absolute risk tol-
erance is linear, i.e. ρ′′(x) = 0, and wealth inequality plays no role on the
occurrence of macroeconomic volatility.18 However, building on Proposition
5, we get from (34) that ∂xi/∂x > 0 and formula (28) implies ρ
′′(x) > 0 as
soon as there are two agents i, j with different utility functions such that
(ai, ei, σi) 6= (aj , ej , σj).
Let us adapt Assumptions 4 and 5 to the case of inelastic labor.
Assumption 8. b ∈ (−1/(1 − µ),−1/(2 − µ)] ∪ [−δ/(1 + δ(1 − µ)), 0) and
ρc ∈ (ρ, ρ¯).
Assumption 9. b ∈ (−1/(2 − µ),−δ/(1 + δ(1 − µ))), ρf ∈ (ρ, ρ¯) and
the flip bifurcation generates saddle-point stable period-two cycles in a right
neighborhood of ρf .
We have then
Proposition 8. Assume that individual preferences are represented by util-
ity functions of the HARA class as defined by (35 ). If there exist at least
two agents i, j with utility functions such that (ai, ei, σi) 6= (aj , ej , σj), then
17See Guiso and Paiella [24].
18Indeed, ρ′′i (xi) = 0 and when (ai, ei, σi) = (a, e, σ), then ρ
′
i(xi) = ρ
′(x) = 1/(1− σ).
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the social absolute risk tolerance is convex and there exists a distribution θ0
such that one of the following cases holds:
i) If Assumption 8 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with monotone convergence for any economy E such that θE ≺I θ
0 and is
saddle-point stable with oscillations otherwise.
ii) If Assumption 9 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
for any economy E such that θE ≺I θ
0 and is unstable otherwise. Moreover,
there generically exist period-two cycles for any economy E characterized
by a distribution θE in a right neighborhood of θ0, which are saddle-point
stable.
This Proposition provides a strong and clear-cut result in the sense that
individual HARA preferences always imply a positive relationship between
wealth inequality and macroeconomic volatility provided a slight amount of
preference heterogeneity across agents is considered.19
These results echo the conclusions obtained with endogenous labor. In-
deed, in Section 8 we considered an economy with heterogeneous agents
characterized by CES preferences leading to individual linear absolute risk
tolerance indices. With Theorem 2 we showed a positive correlation between
wealth inequality and macroeconomic volatility. Therefore, the present anal-
ysis show that this conclusion does not depend on whether the labor supply
is elastic or not and that it is compatible with standard utility functions.
9.2 Pareto wealth distribution and output volatility
As in Section 7 we assume now that the distribution of individual wealth
follows a Pareto distribution of parameter α (or more precisely its discrete
analogue as given by the Zeta distribution, see Assumption 6). We also
assume that agents are homogeneous with respect to their preferences and
focus on a specific class of preferences. In particular, we assume that As-
sumption 7 holds so that their preferences give rise to ρi(xi) = x
ϕ
i /σ, with
σ, ϕ > 0. The associated absolute risk tolerance index ρ(x) is obtained by
equation (54). For any value of ϕ ∈ (0, 1)∪ (1,+∞) such that α > 1+ϕ we
19In Ghiglino and Venditti [22], we also provide illustrations of the correlation between
wealth inequality and macroeconomic volatility using homogeneous preferences character-
ized by a non linear individual absolute risk tolerance index. We use the specification as
given by Assumption 7 and (30).
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find that ρ(x∗) = ρ¯(α) is an increasing and convex function of the level of
inequality, because inequalities increase when α decreases (see Figure 1 in
Appendix 11.7 for an illustration). Supposing that the technology is such
that Assumption 8 or 9 holds, Theorem 3 implies the following result:
Proposition 9. Let Assumptions 2, 6 and 7 hold, together with either As-
sumption 8, or Assumption 9. Assume also that ϕ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,+∞) and
α > 1+ϕ. Then there exists σ¯ > 0, α¯ > 1+ϕ and a level of wealth inequality
characterized by a Gini index G¯ = 1/(2α¯−1) such that when σ ∈ (0, σ¯), one
of the following cases holds:
1 - If Assumption 8 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with monotone convergence for any economy E such that GE < G¯ and is
saddle-point stable with oscillations otherwise.
2 - If Assumption 9 is satisfied, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with oscillating convergence for any economy E such that GE < G¯ and is
unstable otherwise. Moreover, there generically exist period-two cycles, in a
right neighborhood of G¯, which are saddle-point stable.
To conclude, we have shown that when individual wealth follows a Pareto
distribution, an increase in inequality cannot reduce the level of macroe-
conomic volatility, a result that holds independently of whether labour is
provided elastically or inelastically,
10 Conclusion
We have considered a two-sector optimal growth model with endogenous
labor and heterogeneous agents with respect to preferences and their cap-
ital share. We have provided conditions on the slopes of the absolute risk
tolerance indices for consumption and labor in order to get a positive cor-
relation between wealth inequality and macroeconomic volatility. We have
shown that such a conclusion is easily obtained either when the absolute
risk tolerance indices are non linear, even with homogeneous preferences, or
when the absolute risk tolerance indices are linear provided some degree of
preference heterogeneity across agents is introduced.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality assume that there are three types of consumers.
Let ni be the number of agents of type i = 1, 2, 3 with n1 + n2 + n3 = n. It
is easy to show that all agents of the same type are given the same Pareto
weight.20 The social utility function is thus defined by
U(x, ℓ) = max
(xi,li)2i=1
{
η1n1u1(x1) + η2n2u2(x2) + η3n3u3((x− n1x1 − n2x2)/n3)
+ η1n1v1(l¯ − l1) + η2n2v2(l¯ − l2) + η3n3v3(l¯ − (ℓ− n1l1 − n2l2)/n3)
}
with ηi ≥ 0 and η1 + η2 + η3 = 1. The first and second order derivatives of
the social utility function can be related to the derivatives of the individual
utility function of the agents. Indeed, the first order conditions associated
with program (8) give
Ψ1(x1, x2, x; η1, η2) = η1n1u
′
1(x1)− η3n1u
′
3
(
x−n1x1−n2x2
n3
)
= 0 (36)
Ψ2(x1, x2, x; η1, η2) = η2n2u
′
2(x2)− η3n2u
′
3
(
x−n1x1−n2x2
n3
)
= 0 (37)
Φ1(l1, l2, ℓ; η1, η2) = −η1n1v
′
1(l¯ − l1) + η3n1v
′
3
(
l¯ − ℓ−n1l1−n2l2n3
)
= 0 (38)
Φ2(l1, l2, ℓ; η1, η2) = −η2n2v
′
2(l¯ − l2) + η3n2v
′
3
(
l¯ − ℓ−n1l1−n2l2n3
)
= 0 (39)
Notice that the first order conditions with respect to xi are independent from
the first order conditions with respect to li. It follows that the social utility
function is additively separable, i.e. U(x, ℓ) = u(x) − v(ℓ). The following
expressions are easily obtained
u′(x) = η3u
′
3
(
x−n1x1−n2x2
n3
)
= η1u
′
1(x1) = η2u
′
2(x2) > 0
u′′(x) = η1u
′′
1(x1)
∂x1
∂x
v′(ℓ) = η3v
′
3
(
l¯ − ℓ−n1l1−n2l2n3
)
= η1v
′
1(l¯ − l1) = η2v
′
2(l¯ − l2) > 0
v′′(ℓ) = −η1v
′′
1 (l¯ − l1)
∂l1
∂ℓ
(40)
20The first order conditions associated with the maximization program (8) that defines
the social utility function give ηi = λ/u
′
i(xi) with λ ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the resources constraint. Consider then two agents j and k, j 6= k, of the same type,
i.e. such that uj = uk, ωj = ωk and θj = θk. It follows that xj and xk are solutions of
two optimizations problems with the same utility function, the same initial resources and
the same budget constraint. Therefore we obviously derive xj = xk and thus ηj = ηk.
35
where x represents the aggregate consumption. The implicit function theo-
rem applied to (36) and (37) allows us to express x1 as a function of x. In
matrix form we can write(
∂x1
∂x
∂x2
∂x
)
= −
 ∂Ψ1∂x1 ∂Ψ1∂x2
∂Ψ2
∂x1
∂Ψ2
∂x2
−1 ∂Ψ1∂x
∂Ψ2
∂x

We then get
∂x1
∂x =
η2η3u′′2 (x2)u
′′
3 (x3)
η1η2n3u′′1 (x1)u
′′
2 (x2)+η1η3n2u
′′
1 (x1)u
′′
3 (x3)+η2η3n1u
′′
2 (x2)u
′′
3 (x3)
> 0 (41)
and thus u′′(x) < 0. Similarly, the implicit function theorem applied to (38)
and (39) allows us to express l1 as a function of ℓ. In matrix form we have(
∂l1
∂ℓ
∂l2
∂ℓ
)
= −
 ∂Φ1∂l1 ∂Φ1∂l2
∂Φ2
∂l1
∂Φ2
∂l2
−1 ∂Φ1∂ℓ
∂Φ2
∂ℓ

We then get
∂l1
∂ℓ =
η2η3v′′2 (l¯−l2)v
′′
3 (l¯−l3)
η1η2n3v′′1 (l¯−l1)v
′′
2 (l¯−l2)+η1η3n2v
′′
1 (l¯−l1)v
′′
3 (l¯−l3)+η2η3n1v
′′
2 (l¯−l2)v
′′
3 (l¯−l3)
> 0 (42)
and v′′(x) > 0. Under Assumption 1, we also derive from (40) that
limx→0 u
′(x) = +∞ and limℓ→nl¯ v
′(ℓ) = +∞.
11.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Denoting κ = k/ℓ, we derive from (13)-(14) and the first order conditions
associated with program (4) that an aggregate steady state may be defined
as a pair (κ∗, ℓ∗) solution of the following equations
−
T1(κ, µκ, 1)
T2(κ, µκ, 1)
= f11 (k1(κ, µκ, 1), l1(κ, µκ, 1)) = δ
−1 − (1− µ) (43)
u′(ℓT (κ, µκ, 1))T3(κ, µκ, 1) − v
′(ℓ) = 0 (44)
Consider in a first step equation (43). Notice that the steady state
value for κ only depends on the characteristics of the technologies and is
independent from the utility function. Moreover, equation (43) is equivalent
to the equation which defines the stationary capital stock of a two-sector
optimal growth model with inelastic labor. The proof of Theorem 3.1 in
Becker and Tsyganov [3] applies so that there exists one unique κ∗ solution
of (43).
Consider in a second step equation (44) evaluated at κ∗. We get:
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T3(κ
∗, µκ∗, 1) = v
′(ℓ)
u′(ℓT (κ∗,µκ∗,1)) ≡ ϕ(ℓ)
The function ϕ(ℓ) is defined over (0, ℓ¯) and satisfies
ϕ′(ℓ) = u
′(x)v′′(ℓ)−u′′(x)v′(ℓ)T
u′(x)2
> 0
This monotonicity property together with the boundary conditions provided
by Lemma 1 finally garantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution
ℓ∗ ∈ (0, ℓ¯) of equation (44).
Let us now consider the first order conditions corresponding to the indi-
vidual maximization of the intertemporal utility function (1) subject to the
intertemporal budget constraint (2):
δtu′i(xit) = πiRt (45)
δtv′i(l¯ − lit) = πiRtwt (46)
∞∑
t=0
Rtxit =
∞∑
t=0
Rtwtlit + θir0k0 (47)
∀t ≥ 0 and i = 1, . . . , n, where πi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the intertemporal budget constraint (2). From (6) we conclude that the
interest rate satisfies
1 + dt =
rt+(1−µ)pt
pt−1
= −T1(kt,yt)−(1−µ)T2(kt,yt)T2(kt−1,yt−1)
for any t ≥ 1 and 1 + d0 = r0/p−1 for t = 0. The Euler equation (13)
evaluated at a steady state xit = x
∗
i gives 1 + d
∗ = δ−1 and thus Rt = δ
t.
Recall that from (6) we also get T ∗1 = r
∗, T ∗2 = −p
∗ and w∗ = T ∗3 . The
intertemporal budget constraint (47) evaluated along the stationary path
with kt = k
∗ for all t ≥ 0 and p−1 = p
∗ becomes x∗i = w
∗l∗i +(1−δ)θip
∗k∗/δ,
with p∗ = δϑr∗. We then get
x∗i = w
∗l∗i + (1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗θi (48)
with κ∗ = k∗/ℓ∗. Using (45) and (46), we finally obtain
u′i(w
∗l∗i + (1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗θi)w
∗ = v′i(l¯ − l
∗
i ) (49)
Assumption 1 implies limli→l¯ v
′
i(l¯−li) = +∞ > u
′
i(w
∗ l¯+(1−δ)ϑr∗κ∗ℓ∗θi)w
∗.
Therefore, if v′i(l¯) < u
′
i((1 − δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗θi) for any i = 1, . . . , n, there exist
unique steady state values for all individual consumptions x∗i and labor
supplies l∗i solutions of equations (48) and (49). Notice that since equation
(48) depends on θi and ℓ
∗ =
∑n
i=1 l
∗
i , we conclude that x
∗
i and l
∗
i are functions
of the distribution of capital shares θ = (θi)
n
i=1, namely x
∗
i (θ) and l
∗
i (θ). For
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all i = 1, . . . , n, consider finally equations (48) and (49) expressed as follows:
x∗i − w
∗l∗i − (1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗
(
n∑
i=1
l∗i
)
θi = 0
u′i(x
∗
i )w
∗ − v′i(l¯ − l
∗
i ) = 0
(50)
with θj = 1 −
∑n
i=1,i6=j θi. Applying the implicit function theorem, we now
show that x∗i (θ) and l
∗
i (θ) are C
1-functions. The 2n × 2n Jacobian matrix
of (50) with respect to (x∗i , l
∗
i )
n
i=1 is
J(xi,li) =
(
J11 J12
J21 J22
)
with J11 = In×n,
J21 = w
∗

u′′1(x
∗
1) 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 u′′n(x
∗
n)
 , J22 =

v′′1 (l¯ − l
∗
1) 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 v′′n(l¯ − l
∗
n)

and
J12 = −T
∗In×n + (1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗

1− θ1 θ1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · θ1
θ2 1− θ2 θ2 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · θ2
...
. . .
...
...
...
θj−1 · · · θj−1 1− θj−1 θj−1 · · · · · · · · · θj−1
1−
n∑
i=1
i6=j
θi · · · · · · 1−
n∑
i=1
i6=j
θi
n∑
i=1
i6=j
θi 1−
n∑
i=1
i6=j
θi · · · · · · 1−
n∑
i=1
i6=j
θi
θj+1 · · · · · · · · · θj+1 1− θj+1 θj+1 · · · θj+1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
θn · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · θn 1− θn

Consider the matrix B = J22−J21J12. Tedious computations available upon
request show that |B| 6= 0 with sign|B| = (−1)n and B−1 = |B|−1 [bij ]
n
i,j=1
with signbii = (−1)
n−1 and signbij = (−1)
n for i 6= j. The Jacobian matrix
J(xi,li) therefore admits an inverse such that
J−1(xi,li) =
(
In×n + J12B
−1J21 −J12B
−1
−B−1J21 B
−1
)
Tedious computations available upon request also show that
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In×n + J12B
−1J21 = |B|
−1 [|B|In×n + J12 [bij ]J21] ≡ |B|
−1 [cij ]
n
i,j=1
with signcii = (−1)
n and signcij = (−1)
n−1 for i 6= j. The 2n × (n − 1)
Jacobian matrix of (50) with respect to θ = (θi)
n
i=1 with θj = 1−
∑n
i=1,i6=j θi
Jθ = (1− δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗

−1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
...
...
0 · · · 0 −1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
1 · · · · · · 1 1 1 · · · · · · 1
0 · · · · · · 0 0 −1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · · · · 0 −1
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
...
...
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0

)
j − 1
line j
)
n− j
)
n
We then conclude from the implicit function theorem that x∗i (θ) and l
∗
i (θ)
are C1-functions with
h
∂li
∂θj
i
n×(n−1)
= (1−δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗
|B|
[bij ] J21
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
−1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
...
...
0 · · · 0 −1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
1 · · · · · · 1 1 1 · · · · · · 1
0 · · · · · · 0 0 −1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · · · · 0 −1
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
= (1−δ)ϑr
∗κ∗w∗ℓ∗
|B|
[bij ]
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
−u′′1 (x
∗
1) 0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
...
...
0 · · · 0 −u′′j−1(x
∗
j−1) 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
u′′j (x
∗
j ) · · · · · · u
′′
j (x
∗
j ) u
′′
j (x
∗
j ) u
′′
j (x
∗
j ) · · · · · · u
′′
j (x
∗
j )
0 · · · · · · 0 0 −u′′j+1(x
∗
j+1) 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · · · · 0 −u′′n(x
∗
n)
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
39
and
[
∂xi
∂θj
]
n×(n−1)
= − (1−δ)ϑr
∗κ∗ℓ∗
|B| [cij ]

−1 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 −1
1 · · · · · · 1

It follows that
∂x∗i (θ)
∂θi
= −
(1−δ)ϑr∗κ∗ℓ∗(cij−cii)
|B| > 0
∂x∗j (θ)
∂θi
= −
(1−δ)ϑr∗κ∗ℓ∗(cjj−cji)
|B| < 0
∂l∗i (θ)
∂θi
=
(1−δ)ϑr∗κ∗w∗ℓ∗(biju
′′
j (x
∗
j )−biiu
′′
i (x
∗
i ))
|B| < 0
∂l∗j (θ)
∂θi
=
(1−δ)ϑr∗κ∗w∗ℓ∗(bjju
′′
j (x
∗
j )−bjiu
′′
i (x
∗
i ))
|B| > 0
(51)
11.3 Proof of Corollary 1
As ℓ∗(θ) =
∑n
i=1 l
∗
i (θ) and x
∗(θ) =
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i (θ) with l
∗
i (θ) and x
∗
i (θ) some C
1-
functions, we conclude that ℓ∗(θ) and x∗(θ) are also C1-functions. Moreover,
we derive from (51)
∂ℓ∗(θ)
∂θi
=
n∑
k=1
∂l∗k(θ)
∂θi
Recalling that θj = 1 −
∑n
i=1,i6=j θi, tedious computations available upon
request then give
∂ℓ∗(θ)
∂θi
=
(1− δ)ϑr∗κ∗w∗ℓ∗
|B|
∏
k 6=i,j
[
v′′k(l¯ − l
∗
k) + w
∗2u′′k(x
∗
k)
]
× v′′i (l¯ − l
∗
i )v
′′
j (l¯ − l
∗
j )
[
u′′j (x
∗
j )
v′′j (l¯−l
∗
j )
−
u′′i (x
∗
i )
v′′i (l¯−l
∗
i )
]
Under Assumption 1, we know that sign
∏
k 6=i,j[v
′′
k(l¯ − l
∗
k) + w
∗2u′′k(x
∗
k)] =
(−1)n−2 and thus sign|B|
∏
k 6=i,j[v
′′
k(l¯ − l
∗
k) + w
∗2u′′k(x
∗
k)] = (−1)
2(n−1) > 0.
It follows therefore that ∂ℓ∗(θ)/∂θi > 0 if and only if
u′′j (x
∗
j )
v′′j (l¯−l
∗
j )
>
u′′i (x
∗
i )
v′′i (l¯−l
∗
i )
Using (18) and (19), this condition becomes (ǫjl (lj)/ǫ
j
x(xj))(lj/xj) >
(ǫil(li)/ǫ
i
x(xi))(li/xi). But, as the n agents are ordered according to their
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capital endowment, i.e. θi > θj for i < j, starting from a configuration
of pure equality with θk = 1/n for all k, we know from Theorem 1 that if
we increase θi and thus decrease θj we get xi > xj and ℓi < ℓj . It follows
that lj/xj > li/xi. The last result is finally obtained from the fact that
x∗(θ) = T (κ∗, µκ∗, 1)ℓ∗(θ).
11.4 Proof of Proposition 1
In a one-sector economy with heterogeneous agents, Kehoe et al. [27] show
that the welfare weights are continuous functions of the initial capital stock.
This continuity property happens to be satisfied because the value function
of the planner’s problem (10) is C2. However, in a multisector economy such
a property is much more difficult to obtain. Santos [35] shows that the main
sufficient condition to get this property is to assume strong concavity for the
indirect utility function V(kt, kt+1) (see Assumption B and Theorem 2.2 in
Santos [35]). On a compact set, a C2 function V(kt, kt+1) is strongly concave
if its Hessian matrix is always non-singular and negative-definite. In other
words, the smallest eigenvalue in absolute value of the Hessian matrix needs
to be strictly positive over the domain of definition of V(kt, kt+1). In our
two-sector model with endogenous labor, the indirect social utility function
also depends on ℓt:
V (kt, kt+1, ℓt) = u(T (kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ℓt))− v(ℓt)
with ℓt a solution of equation (14):
u′(T (kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ℓt))wt − v
′(ℓt) ≡ φ(kt, kt+1, ℓt) = 0
Since under Assumptions 1 and 2
φ3(kt, kt+1, ℓt) = u
′′(xt)w
2
t + u
′(xt)T33 − v
′′(ℓt) < 0
we derive from the implicit function theorem that ℓt = ψ(kt, kt+1) with ψ(.)
a C1-function such that
ψ1(kt, kt+1) = −
u′′(xt)(rt+(1−µ)pt)wt+u′(xt)(T31−(1−µ)T32)
u′′(xt)w2t+u
′(xt)T33−v′′(ℓt)
ψ2(kt, kt+1) = −
u′(xt)T32−u′′(xt)ptwt
u′′(xt)w2t+u
′(xt)T33−v′′(ℓt)
We then obtain
V(kt, kt+1) = u(T (kt, kt+1 − (1− µ)kt, ψ(kt, kt+1)))− v(ψ(kt, kt+1))
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Consider now the social production function T (kt, yt, ℓt) with yt = kt+1 −
(1 − µ)kt and ℓt = ψ(kt, kt+1). Proceeding in a similar way as for the
set of admissible paths D˜, we derive that T (kt, yt, ℓt) = 0 if and only if
kt+1 = h(kt). Assumption 2 then implies that there exists kˆ > 0 such that
h(kt) > kt when kt < kˆ while h(kt) < kt when kt > kˆ. As a result, V(kt, kt+1)
is defined over the compact, convex set
Dˆ =
{
(kt, kt+1) ∈ R
2
+|0 ≤ kt ≤ kˆ, (1− µ)kt ≤ kt+1 ≤ h(kt)
}
We know that T is homogeneous of degree one so that its Hessian matrix
HT (kt, kt+1) is singular for any (kt, kt+1) ∈ Dˆ. As shown in Benhabib and
Nishimura [5] and Bosi et al. [9], the second order derivatives of the social
production function depend on the allocations of capital and labor across
the two sectors. We get indeed
T12(k, y, ℓ) = −T11(k, y, ℓ)b(k, y, ℓ)
T22(k, y, ℓ) = T11(k, y, ℓ)b(k, y, ℓ)
2
T13(k, y, ℓ) = −T11(k, y, ℓ)a(k, y, ℓ)
T23(k, y, ℓ) = T11(k, y, ℓ)a(k, y, ℓ)b(k, y, ℓ)
T33(k, y, ℓ) = T11(k, y, ℓ)a(k, y, ℓ)b(k, y, ℓ)
2
(52)
where
b(k, y, ℓ) = l
0
T
(
k1
l1
− k
0
l0
)
(53)
is the relative capital intensity difference across sectors and a(k, y, ℓ) =
k0/l0 > 0 is the capital-labor ratio in the consumption good sector. We
derive from (52):
HT (kt, kt+1) = T11
 1 −bt −at−bt b2t atbt
−at atbt a
2
t

with at = a(kt, kt+1 − (1 − µ)kt, ψ(kt, kt+1)) and bt = b(kt, kt+1 − (1 −
µ)kt, ψ(kt, kt+1)). The Hessian matrix of V is then
HV(kt, kt+1) = u
′T11
(
1 −(1− µ)
0 1
)(
1 −bt
−bt b
2
t
)(
1 0
−(1− µ) 1
)
+ u′T11
(
1 −(1− µ)
0 1
)(
−at −at
atbt atbt
)(
ψ1 0
0 ψ2
)
+ u′′
(
T1 − (1− µ)T2
T2
)
( T1 − (1− µ)T2 + T3ψ1 T2 + T3ψ2 )
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Tedious but straightforward computations finally give the determinant of
HV(kt, kt+1) as
|HV | = −
u′(xt)u′′(xt)v′′(ℓt)T11(btrt−pt)2
u′′(xt)w2t+u
′(xt)T33−v′′(ℓt)
≥ 0
Under Assumptions 1-2, we conclude from Lemma 1 that the Hessian matrix
of V is non singular if over the interior of the set Dˆ we have btrt − pt 6= 0 or
equivalently, T2(kt, kt+1−(1−µ)kt, ℓt)+b(kt, kt+1−(1−µ)kt, ℓt)T1(kt, kt+1−
(1 − µ)kt, ℓt) 6= 0. This property also implies that the value function of the
planner’s problem (10) is C2.
11.5 Proof of Theorem 2
We begin by showing that if the social curvature indices ρ(x∗) and γ(ℓ∗) are
linear functions, then the degree of inequality does not have any influence
on the existence of endogenous fluctuations. Linear expressions for ρ(x∗)
and γ(ℓ∗) are obtained in particular when agents are identical with respect
to preferences and their utility function is CES (see (33)). In this case,
ρi(xi) = xi/σ, γi(li) = li/γ, with li = l¯ − Li, σ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, and thus
ρ(x∗) = x∗/σ and γ(ℓ∗) = ℓ∗/γ. As a result, the inequalities entering the
conditions in Propositions 3 and 4 become:
ρ(x∗) > ρi ⇔
1
σ > Λi
γ(ℓ∗) < γi ⇔
1
γ < T
∗Γi
[
1
σ − Λi
]
for i = c, y, since x∗ = ℓ∗T ∗. As they are based only on parameters, it
follows that inequality does not have any effect on the occurrence of cycles.
Assume therefore that Assumption 3 is satisfied. We focus on bilateral
transfers between pairs of agents i and j that are elasticity-ordered according
to Definition 3. Consider first the case in which Assumption 4 holds. Let
us denote ζc(θ) = ρ(T
∗ℓ∗(θ))− ρc and ξc(θ) = γ(ℓ
∗(θ))− γc with ρc < ρ¯ and
γc ∈ (γ, γ¯) as defined by (26). Proposition 3 shows that the steady state is
saddle-point stable with oscillating convergence if ρ(x∗) > ρc and γ(ℓ
∗) < γc.
Therefore, an increase of wealth inequality implied by an increase of the
share of capital θi owned by agent i, and thus a decrease of the share of
capital θj owned by agents j, leads to damped fluctuations if the functions
ζc(θ) and ξc(θ) are respectively increasing and decreasing with respect to θi.
We easily get
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∂ζc(θ)
∂θi
= T ∗ ∂ℓ
∗(θ)
∂θi
[ρ′(x∗)− Λc]
∂ξc(θ)
∂θi
= ∂ℓ
∗(θ)
∂θi
[
γ′(ℓ∗)− ΓcT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λc]
]
These derivatives are respectively positive and negative in the following two
configurations:
i) if ∂ℓ∗(θ)/∂θi < 0, ρ
′(x∗) < Λc and γ
′(ℓ∗) > ΓcT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λc],
ii) if ∂ℓ∗(θ)/∂θi > 0, ρ
′(x∗) > Λc and γ
′(ℓ∗) < ΓcT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λc].
The final result then follows from Corollary 1.
Consider now the case in which Assumption 5 holds. Let us denote
ζf (θ) = ρ(T
∗ℓ∗(θ))−ρf and ξf (θ) = γ(ℓ
∗(θ))−γf with ρf < ρ¯ and γf ∈ (γ, γ¯)
as defined by (27). Proposition 4 shows that the steady state is locally
unstable with oscillating divergence if ρ(x∗) > ρf and γ(ℓ
∗) < γf , and γf
is a flip bifurcation value so that there generically exist period-two cycles,
in a left neighborhood of γf , which are saddle-point stable. Therefore, an
increase of wealth inequality implied by an increase of the share of capital
θi owned by agent i, and thus a decrease of the share of capital θj owned by
agents j, leads to persistent fluctuations if the functions ζf (θ) and ξc(θ) are
respectively increasing and decreasing with respect to θi. We easily get
∂ζf (θ)
∂θi
= T ∗ ∂ℓ
∗(θ)
∂θi
[ρ′(x∗)− Λf ]
∂ξf (θ)
∂θi
= ∂ℓ
∗(θ)
∂θi
[
γ′(ℓ∗)− ΓfT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λf ]
]
These derivatives are respectively positive and negative in the following two
configurations:
i) if ∂ℓ∗(θ)/∂θi < 0, ρ
′(x∗) < Λf and γ
′(ℓ∗) > ΓfT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λf ],
ii) if ∂ℓ∗(θ)/∂θi > 0, ρ
′(x∗) > Λf and γ
′(ℓ∗) < ΓfT
∗ [ρ′(x∗)− Λf ].
The final result then follows from Corollary 1.
11.6 Proof of lemma 3
As there is a unique consumption good and agents have a common time
discount factor, along the steady state the distribution of wealth is identical
to the distribution of individual consumption. On the other hand we have
seen that xi(θ) = wli(θ) + (1 − δ)ϑrκlθi = wli(θ) + (1 − δ)ϑrkθi. However,
the steady state quantities depend on the distribution of shares of capital, so
that even if k∗ is a steady state with a distribution θ, it is not a steady state
with a distribution θ′. We therefore define a distribution χ such χi = kθi
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so that
∑n
i=1 χi is not constrained to be 1. We then have xi(χ) = wli(χ) +
(1− δ)ϑrχi. For given values of all the xi it is possible to find values of the
χi such that the above n equations hold. Note that this is true even when
several agents have the same consumption and therefore get associated with
the same χ.
11.7 Proof of Theorem 3
As normalized incomes follow a Zeta distribution and along the steady state
xi = ωi, normalized individual consumption x˜i = xi/xmin also follows a Zeta
distribution. The associated value of ρ(x) is
ρ(x) =
∞∑
s=1
1
ζ(α)
1
sα
ρ(x(s)) =
1
ζ(α)
∞∑
s=1
s−α
(x(s))ϕ
σ
=
1
ζ(α)
∞∑
s=1
s−α
(sxmin)
ϕ
σ
=
xϕmin
σ
ζ(α− ϕ)
ζ(α)
= ρ¯(α) (54)
where ζ(α) =
∑∞
s=1 s
−α is the Riemann Zeta function. As explained in
Section 7.1, the sequence x is not implementable. However, it can be ap-
proximated by an implementable distribution of measure η that gives rise
to a ρ which is arbitrarily close to ρ(x). Indeed, consider the distribution Γ
obtained in Lemma 2. Clearly, in this case
lim
n→∞
ρ(v(x)) = ρ(x)
We therefore can ignore this issue and assume that x is implementable.
Notice that to ensure a finite value for ζ(α−ϕ) we need to assume α > 1+ϕ.
As the stability properties depend also on the risk tolerance to leisure
we need to know the distribution of leisure along the steady state. From
(15) we derive that within the class of preferences considered here, leisure is
related to consumption as follows
−σ
x1−ϕi
1−ϕ + wˆ = γ
l1−νi
1−ν
with wˆ = logw and w as defined in (6), giving
li =
[
ν−1
γ(1−ϕ) [σ − (1− ϕ)wˆ]
] 1
1−νi x
1−ϕ
1−ν
i
(55)
Notice that this last equation requires (ν − 1)(1 − ϕ)[σ − (1 − ϕ)wˆ] > 0.
Combining (54) and (55) we then get
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γ(ℓ) =
1
γ
[
ν − 1
γ(1− ϕ)
[σ − (1− ϕ)wˆ]
] ν
1−ν 1
ζ(α)
∞∑
s=1
s−α(x(s))
1−ϕ
1−ν
ν
=
x
1−ϕ
1−ν
ν
min
γ
[
ν − 1
γ(1− ϕ)
[σ − (1− ϕ)wˆ]
] ν
1−ν ζ(α+ 1−ϕν−1 ν)
ζ(α)
≡ γ¯(α) (56)
Some calculations show that as soon as (ν − 1)(1 − ϕ)[σ − (1 − ϕ)wˆ] > 0,
the functions ρ¯(α) and γ¯(α) are respectively decreasing and increasing in α.
An illustration is given by the following Figure with ϕ = 0.5 and ν = 1.5:
ρ¯(α)
α2 2 α
γ¯(α)
Figure 1: ρ¯(α) and γ¯(α).
Notice that these properties do not depend on the curvature of ρ(x∗) and
γ(ℓ∗), i.e. on whether ϕ or ν are larger or smaller than 1. For instance, a
similar table is obtained if we set ϕ = 1.1 and ν = 0.5
As inequalities increase when α decreases, we then conclude that ρ(x∗) =
ρ¯(α) and γ(ℓ∗) = γ¯(α) are respectively increasing and decreasing functions
of the level of inequality. Building on Propositions 3 and 4, we may then
drop the conditions on the elasticity in Definition 3 which simply becomes
in the current framework: ρ′(x∗) > Ψ with Ψ ∈ {Λc,Λf}. For a given set of
technologies giving wˆ = logw, and assuming that ϕ is such that (1−ϕ)wˆ ≤ 0,
it follows that this new version of Assumption 3 will be satisfied if the slope
of ρ¯(α) is large enough in absolute value, i.e. if σ is low enough. Notice
that as γ¯(α) is an increasing function of α , we do not need any particular
restriction on its slope. We may also compute precisely the bounds ρ, ρ¯, γ
and γ¯. As limα→1+ϕ ζ(α − ϕ) = +∞ and limα→+∞ ζ(α) = 1, we get from
(54) and (56):
ρ = lim
α→+∞
ρ¯(α) =
1
σ
, ρ¯ = lim
α→1+ϕ
ρ¯(α) +∞ (57)
46
and
γ = lim
α→1+ϕ
γ¯(α) = 1
γ
[
ν−1
γ(1−ϕ) [σ − (1− ϕ)wˆ]
] ν
1−ν ζ(1+ϕ+
1−ϕ
ν−1
ν)
ζ(1+ϕ)
(58)
γ¯ = lim
α→+∞
ρ¯(α) = 1
γ
[
ν−1
γ(1−ϕ) [σ − (1− ϕ)wˆ]
] ν
1−ν (59)
11.8 Computations for the CES example
As shown in Nishimura et al. [29] and Nishimura and Venditti [30], with the
externality parameters set equal to zero and an identical elasticity of capital-
labor substitution across sectors, the steady state values for the capital-labor
ratio κ∗ and the consumption per capita T ∗ = T (κ∗, κ∗, 1) are given by:
κ∗ =
“
α1β0
α0β1
”ς„ (δβ1)1−ς−β1
β0
« ς
1−ς
1−(δβ1)
ς
“
1−
“
α1β0
α0β1
”ς”
T ∗ =
[1−(δβ1)
ς ]
“
α1β0
α0β1
”ς
1−(δβ1)
ς
“
1−
“
α1β0
α0β1
”ς”
[
α0
(
α1β0
α0β1
)1−ς
+ α1
β0
(δβ1)
1−ς−β1
] ς
ς−1
with (δβ1)
1−ς > β1. We also derive the prices
r∗ = T ∗1 = α1
[
α0
(
α1β0
α0β1
)1−ς
(δβ1)
1−ς−β1
β0
+ α1
] 1
ς−1
and
p∗ = −T ∗2 = δr
∗, w∗ = T ∗3 = r
∗ β0
β1
(
(δβ1)
1−ς−β1
β0
) 1
1−ς
At the steady state we get the capital intensity difference across sectors
b = (δβ1)
ς
[
1−
(
α1β0
α0β1
)ς]
the share of capital in total income
s =
[
1 + β0β1
(
α1β0
α0β1
)−ς ( (δβ1)1−ς−β1
β0
)
(1− δb)
]−1
and the ratio of elasticities
εck
εrk
= α1β0α0
ς((δβ1)1−ς−β1b)
(δβ1)1−ς
“
α1β0
α0β1
”ς−1
[1−(δβ1)
ς ][(δβ1)1−ς−β1]
> 0
Consider now the consumption side of the model. Recall that except
agent 1, all the other n−1 agents have identical preferences. More precisely,
agent 1 is characterized by the pair (σ1, γ1), while each agent j = 2, . . . , n
is characterized by the common pair (σj , γj) = (σ, γ). We also assume
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that all agents j = 2, . . . , n own the same share of capital θ2 while agent 1
owns a share θ1 > θ2. It follows that for a given share θ1 ∈ (0, 1), we get
θ2 = (1− θ1)/(n − 1). The first order conditions (48) give
x1 = w
∗l1 + (1− δ)r
∗κ∗ (l1 + (n− 1)l2) θ1
xj = x2 = w
∗l2 + (1− δ)r
∗κ∗ (l1 + (n− 1)l2) (1− θ1)/(n − 1)
with
l1 = x
−σ1/γ1
1 (w
∗)1/γ1 , l2 = lj = x
−σ/γ
j (w
∗)1/γ (60)
Solving the first equation with respect to l2 gives
l2 = l2(x1) =
x1−x
−σ1/γ1
1 (w
∗)1/γ1 [w∗+(1−δ)r∗κ∗θ1]
(1−δ)r∗κ∗θ1(n−1)
Solving the second equation and using the previous one then yields:
(l2(x1))
−γ/σ(w∗)1/σ − l2(x1) [w
∗ + (1− δ)r∗κ∗(1− θ1)]
− (1− δ)r∗κ∗ 1−θ1n−1 x
−σ1/γ1
1 (w
∗)1/γ1 = 0
x∗1(θ) is obtained as a solution of this equation and allows to compute l
∗
2(θ),
l∗1(θ) and x
∗
2(θ). We then get x
∗(θ) = x∗1(θ) + (n − 1)x
∗
2(θ), ℓ
∗(θ) = l∗1(θ) +
(n − 1)l∗2(θ), and thus ρ(x
∗(θ)) = x∗1(θ)/σ1 + (n − 1)x
∗
2(θ)/σ, γ(ℓ
∗(θ)) =
l∗1(θ)/γ1 + (n− 1)l
∗
2(θ)/γ.
We need also to define the intervals of admissible values for ρ(x) and
γ(ℓ). We start with the most equal distribution θe = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n).
The first order conditions (48) give
xe1 = w
∗le1 + (1− δ)r
∗κ∗ (le1 + (n− 1)l
e
2) /n
xej = x
e
2 = w
∗le2 + (1− δ)r
∗κ∗ (le1 + (n− 1)l
e
2) /n
with (60). Solving the first equation with respect to le2 gives
le2 = l
e
2(x
e
1) =
n[xe1−(xe1)−σ1/γ1 (w∗)1/γ1 [w∗+(1−δ)r∗κ∗/n]]
(1−δ)r∗κ∗(n−1)
Solving the second equation and using the previous one then yields:
(le2(x
e
1))
−γ/σ(w∗)1/σ − le2(x
e
1)
[
w∗ + (1− δ)r∗κ∗ n−1n
]
− (1− δ) r
∗κ∗
n (x
e
1)
−σ1/γ1(w∗)1/γ1 = 0
x1(θ
e) is obtained as a solution of this equation and allows to compute
l2(θ
e), l1(θ
e) and x2(θ
e). We then get x(θe) = x1(θ
e) + (n − 1)x2(θ
e),
ℓ(θe) = l1(θ
e) + (n − 1)l2(θ
e), and thus ρˆ = x1(θ
e)/σ1 + (n − 1)x2(θ
e)/σ,
γˆ = l1(θ
e)/γ1 + (n− 1)l2(θ
e)/γ.
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We deal now with with the most unequal distribution θu = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
From the first order conditions (48) we get
xu1 = w
∗lu1 + (1− δ)r
∗κ∗ (lu1 + (n− 1)l
u
2 )
xuj = x
u
2 = w
∗lu2
with (60). From the second equation we derive
x2(θ
u) = (w∗)
1+γ
σ+γ , l2(θ
u) = (w∗)
1−σ
σ+γ
Solving the first equation with respect to xu1 then yields:
xu1 − (x
u
1)
−σ1/γ1(w∗)1/γ1T ∗ − (1− δ)r∗κ∗(n− 1)(w∗)
1−σ
σ+γ = 0
since T ∗ = w∗ + (1 − δ)r∗κ∗. It follows that x1(θ
u) is obtained as a solu-
tion of this equation and allows to compute l1(θ
u). We then get x(θu) =
x1(θ
u) + (n − 1)(w∗)(1+γ)/(σ+γ), ℓ(θu) = l1(θ
u) + (n − 1)(w∗)(1−σ)/(σ+γ),
and thus ρ˜ = x1(θ
e)/σ1 + (n − 1)(w
∗)(1+γ)/(σ+γ)/σ, γ˜ = l1(θ
e)/γ1 + (n −
1)(w∗)(1−σ)/(σ+γ)/γ.
11.9 Proof of Proposition 6
We proceed numerically by finding parameters’ values which satisfy b ∈
(−∞,−1] ∪ [−δ, 0), or equivalently
α1β0/(α0β1) ∈ (0, (1 + (δ
(ς−1)/ςβ1)
−ς)1/ς ] ∪ [(1 + (δβ1)
−ς)1/ς ,+∞) (61)
with ρc < ρ¯ and γc ∈ (γ, γ¯).
Let α1 = 0.45, β1 = 0.2, δ = 0.6, ς = 1.187, ςˆ = 0.241, n = 25,
σ1 = 0.65, σ = 0.582, γ1 = 0.5 and γ = 7.9. Then, using the expressions
given in Appendix 11.8, we find that b ≈ −0.249, i.e. (61) is satisfied,
x1(θ
e) ≈ 0.246, x2(θ
e) ≈ 0.349, l1(θ
e) ≈ 0.6, l2(θ
e) ≈ 0.93, x1(θ
u) ≈ 1.458,
x2(θ
u) ≈ 0.294, l1(θ
u) ≈ 0.059 and l2(θ
u) ≈ 0.944. It follows that x(θe) ≈
8.62, ℓ(θe) ≈ 22.98, x(θu) ≈ 8.52, ℓ(θu) ≈ 22.72, ρ = ρ˜ = ρ(x(θu)) = 14.38,
ρ¯ = ρˆ = ρ(x(θe)) = 14.768, γ = γ˜ = γ(ℓ(θu)) = 2.987 and γ¯ = γˆ =
γ(x(θe)) = 4.036.
Let us first consider an economy A with θA1 = 0.05, θ
A
2 = 0.038 and
thus θA = (0.05, 0.038, · · · , 0.038). We get x∗1(θ
A) ≈ 0.253, x∗2(θ
A) ≈ 0.348,
l∗1(θ
A) ≈ 0.579, l∗2(θ
A) ≈ 0.932 and thus x∗(θA) ≈ 8.61, ℓ∗(θA) ≈ 22.96,
ρ(x∗(θA)) ≈ 14.754, γ(ℓ∗(θA)) ≈ 3.99, ρc ≈ 11.277 and γc ≈ 3.79.
Let us now consider an economy B with θB1 = 0.5, θ
B
2 = 0.0208 and
thus θB = (0.5, 0.0208, · · · , 0.0208). We get x∗1(θ
B) ≈ 0.76, x∗2(θ
B) ≈ 0.322,
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l∗1(θ
B) ≈ 0.138, l∗2(θ
B) ≈ 0.937 and thus x∗(θB) ≈ 8.49, ℓ∗(θB) ≈ 22.648,
ρ(x∗(θB)) ≈ 14.46, γ(ℓ∗(θB)) ≈ 3.12, ρc ≈ 11.123 and γc ≈ 3.64.
For any θ1 ∈ (0.05, 0.5), we then find that ρc < ρ < ρ¯, γc ∈ (γ, γ¯),
ρ(x∗(θ)) ∈ (ρ, ρ¯) and γ(ℓ∗(θ)) ∈ (γ, γ¯). For economy A, we have
γ(ℓ∗(θA)) ∈ (γc, γ¯) while for economy B we have γ(ℓ
∗(θB)) ∈ (γ, γc).
Therefore there exists θ01 ≈ 0.1058 ∈ (0.05, 0.5), θ
0
2 ≈ 0.03726 and thus
θ0 = (0.1058, 0.03726, · · · , 0.03726) such that γ(ℓ∗(θ0)) = γc. Case i) in
Definition 3 and Assumption 4 hold. Therefore, case 1- in Theorem 2 im-
plies that a sufficiently high level of wealth inequality leads to a value of
γ(ℓ∗) lower than γc and thus to the existence of damped fluctuations. By
continuity there exists an open set of parameters’ values close to the previ-
ous values such that the same result holds.
11.10 Proof of Proposition 7
We proceed numerically by finding parameters’ values which satisfy b ∈
(−1,−δ), or equivalently
α1β0/(α0β1) ∈ ([1 + (δ
(ς−1)/γβ1)
−γ ]1/γ , [1 + (δβ1)
−γ ]1/γ) (62)
with ρf < ρ¯ and γf ∈ (γ, γ¯).
Let α1 = 0.85, β1 = 0.2, δ = 0.1, ς = 1.49, ςˆ = 0.589, n = 26, σ1 = 1.666,
σ = 0.375, γ1 = 1 and γ = 24.2. Then, using the expressions given in
Appendix 11.8, we find that b ≈ −0.304, i.e. (62) is satisfied, x1(θ
e) ≈ 0.175,
x2(θ
e) ≈ 0.168, l1(θ
e) ≈ 1.044, l2(θ
e) ≈ 0.913, x1(θ
u) ≈ 2.927, x2(θ
u) ≈
0.053, l1(θ
u) ≈ 0.0096 and l2(θ
u) ≈ 0.93. It follows that x(θe) ≈ 4.38,
ℓ(θe) ≈ 23.88, x(θu) ≈ 4.267, ℓ(θu) ≈ 23.26, ρ = ρ˜ = ρ(x(θu)) = 5.33,
ρ¯ = ρˆ = ρ(x(θe)) = 11.32, γ = γ˜ = γ(ℓ(θu)) = 0.97 and γ¯ = γˆ = γ(x(θe)) =
1.987.
Let us first consider an economy A with θ1 = 0.04, θ2 = 0.0384 and thus
θA = (0.04, 0.0384, · · · , 0.0384). We get x∗1(θ
A) ≈ 0.178, x∗2(θ
A) ≈ 0.168,
l∗1(θ
A) ≈ 1.016, l∗2(θ
A) ≈ 0.914 and thus x∗(θA) ≈ 4.377, ℓ∗(θA) ≈ 23.86,
ρ(x∗(θA)) ≈ 11.3, γ(ℓ∗(θA)) ≈ 1.96, ρf ≈ 1.496 and γf ≈ 1.72.
Let us now consider an economy B with θ1 = 0.2, θ2 = 0.032 and
thus θB = (0.2, 0.032, · · · , 0.032). We get x∗1(θ
B) ≈ 0.587, x∗2(θ
B) ≈ 0.145,
l∗1(θ
B) ≈ 0.14, l∗2(θ
B) ≈ 0.915 and thus x∗(θB) ≈ 4.22, ℓ∗(θB) ≈ 23.03,
ρ(x∗(θB)) ≈ 10.05, γ(ℓ∗(θB)) ≈ 1.086, ρf ≈ 1.44 and γf ≈ 1.51.
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For any θ1 ∈ (0.04, 0.2), we then find that ρf < ρ < ρ¯, γf ∈
(γ, γ¯), ρ(x∗(θ)) ∈ (ρ, ρ¯) and γ(ℓ∗(θ)) ∈ (γ, γ¯). For economy A, we have
γ(ℓ∗(θA)) ∈ (γf , γ¯) while for economy B we have γ(ℓ
∗(θB)) ∈ (γ, γf ).
Therefore there exists θ01 ≈ 0.05792 ∈ (0.04, 0.2), θ
0
2 ≈ 0.03768 and thus
θ0 = (0.05792, 0.03768, · · · , 0.03768) such that γ(ℓ∗(θ0)) = γf . Case i) in
Definition 3 and Assumptions 5 hold. Therefore, case 2- in Theorem 2 ap-
plies: increasing the level of wealth inequality leads to decreasing values
of γ(ℓ∗) that will cross the flip bifurcation value γf , and thus imply the
existence of period-two cycles. By continuity there exists an open set of
parameters’ values close to the previous values such that the same result
holds.
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